

RECEIVED
23 JUL 1954
LIBRARY
OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
OF AUSTRALIA

EASTERN WORLD

S.E.ASIA • FAR EAST • PACIFIC



LONDON

JULY 1954

Volume VIII

Number 7

Contents include:

**PERSONAL
IMPRESSIONS
OF INDIA**

EMANUEL CELLER

**NORTH AND SOUTH
INDIA**

C. S. VENKATACHAR

**TIBET AND THE
CHINESE
COMMUNISTS**

WERNER LEVI

**CHINA'S FOREIGN
TRADE EXPANDS**

LU HSU-CHANG



**JAPAN'S TRADE
WITH ASIA**

TOKYO CORRESPONDENT

NON COPY 1

TWO SHILLINGS

so many things...



If you need this 60,000 kW. steam-driven, hydrogen-cooled alternator unit or the small diesel engine-driven alternator set, 'ENGLISH ELECTRIC' can supply either—and a great range of other things besides, from jet aircraft to television tubes. The Company's engineering experience is unique and this is reflected in every 'ENGLISH ELECTRIC' product.

have made
'ENGLISH ELECTRIC'
famous

Generating Plant—Steam, Hydraulic, Gas Turbine or Diesel. Transformers, Rectifiers and Switchgear. Industrial Electrification. Electric and Diesel-Electric Traction. Marine Propulsion and Auxiliaries. Aircraft. Aircraft Electrical Equipment. Industrial Electronic Equipment. Instruments. Domestic Electrical Appliances. Television Receivers.

THE ENGLISH ELECTRIC COMPANY LIMITED, QUEENS HOUSE, KINGSWAY, LONDON, W.C.2

Offices and representatives throughout the world



The Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China was incorporated in England by Royal Charter on 29th December, 1853, and during the ensuing century its system of Branches has been progressively extended to most centres of commercial importance throughout Southern and South Eastern Asia and the Far East. At all these Branches a complete banking service is available and, in particular, facilities are provided for the financing of international trade in co-operation with the Bank's offices in London, Manchester and Liverpool, its Agencies in New York and Hamburg, and a world-wide range of Banking correspondents.

THE CHARTERED BANK OF INDIA, AUSTRALIA AND CHINA

Head Office: 38 Bishopsgate, London, E.C.2.

'Realms of Silver,' Sir Compton Mackenzie's history of the Bank, has been published by Routledge & Kegan Paul. Copies of the book may be ordered through any bookseller at a cost of 25/-

EASTERN WORLD

45 DORSET STREET, LONDON, W.1

TELEPHONE: WELBECK 7439

CABLES: TADICO, LONDON

EDITOR AND MANAGING DIRECTOR: H. C. TAUSSIG

DISTRIBUTION MANAGER: E. M. BIRD

SUBSCRIPTION: £1. 5. post free

AIR MAIL:—Subscriptions taken by air mail to all countries depend on cost of postage added to the basic subscription fee of £1. 5. (Present additional costs: £2. 8. p.a.)

Registered for transmission to Canada including Newfoundland

World Copyright Reserved

CONTENTS

	PAGE
EDITORIAL	5
Westminster and the East	Harold Davies, M.P. 7
Asia in Washington	David C. Williams 8
Personal Impressions of India	Hon. Emanuel Celler 9
Unrest in Pakistan	Diplomatic Correspondent 11
The Two Pakistans	Dacca Correspondent 12
North and South India	C. S. Venkatachar 13
French Settlements in India	G. S. Bhargava 16
Myths about Formosa	W. G. Goddard 18
European Refugees in China	20
Tibet and the Chinese Communists	Werner Levi 21
Japanese-American Relations since 1952 (II)	Hugh H. Smythe 22
Asia for the Asians and Japan	Tokyo Correspondent 24
FROM ALL QUARTERS	26
BOOKS ON THE FAR EAST	28
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR	33
Some Mediaeval Travellers to the East	James Ledwith 34
LONDON NOTEBOOK	36
Asian Diplomats in London—Najib-Ullah (Afghanistan)	37
Britain's New Attitude to Asian Affairs	Andrew Roth 38
ECONOMIC SECTION	
China's Foreign Trade Expands	Lu Hsu-chang 40
Japan's Trade with Asia	Tokyo Correspondent 43
Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation	Karachi Correspondent 44
Austria's Trade with Pakistan	H. Hirschrodt 46
The Austrian Textile Industry and South-East Asia	48
Railways in South-East Asia	A. James 50

COVER PICTURE SHOWS:

Stone lion guarding a tomb near Nanking, China

Believing in the freedom of the press, this journal represents a forum where articles containing many different, and often controversial, opinions are being published. They do not necessarily express the views or policy of this paper.



BY APPOINTMENT
ARDATH TOBACCO CO. LTD.
STATE EXPRESS
CIGARETTE MANUFACTURERS
TO THE LATE KING GEORGE VI.

For over half a century
STATE EXPRESS 555
have maintained their
reputation as the best
cigarettes in the world



The House of **STATE EXPRESS**. 210 PICCADILLY, LONDON, W.1.

EASTERN WORLD

London

July

1954

The Wiser Course

WITH the conclusion of the meeting in Washington and Chou En-lai's talks in Delhi and Rangoon, an end of a particularly confused and urgent period in South-East Asian politics has been reached. The situation, in effect, has not changed, but it has become more clear cut. The United States was not to be convinced that a pact of any sort would be worth concluding with China because it is convinced that that country is bent on the expansion of her revolution to the south. Chou En-lai, for China's part, has tried to convince India and Burma that his country has no evil intent, that the revolution cannot be exported, and that China's greatest fear is the same as that of other countries of Asia—the encroachment of hostile forces of western colonialism in the East.

It is evident that no amount of persuasion by the British Prime Minister and Mr. Eden could convince the Americans that to pursue a policy of treating China as an evil and satanic influence is not only internationally immature but highly dangerous. To a great number of people on this side of the Atlantic who are just as opposed to the creed of Communism as any American, it is clear that the fundamental premise of United States policy is not only misguided but sometimes downright dishonest. The self-righteous undertone in statements of politicians like Senator Knowland about the wickedness of the Communist desire to spread their ideology by force rings particularly hollow against the background of situations like Guatemala. To Asians the brand becomes indelible and the suspicion deeper.

If the Burmese and Indians have extracted an assurance from Chou En-lai, as reports strongly suggest they have done, that China has enough to cope with inside her borders and has no cause to threaten the sovereignty of neighbouring countries, then the foundations of Asian solidarity have been laid. It is not an assurance that China would have given lightly in the context of present tensions, and she certainly would not have given it at all if she had thought there was even the remotest chance of South-East Asian countries supporting an American crusade (even if only a diplomatic one) against China.

It is worth weighing thoughtfully what such an assurance means. The Peking Government, on its own initiative, has in effect bound itself over to keep the peace in South-East Asia provided it is not threatened or provoked. One move by China that could be construed by the countries of the

region as at all of aggressive intent could arouse their suspicions to the extent that they might be prepared to forfeit their neutralism and be in a ready state of mind to take steps towards a defensive line-up against China.

There is nothing to suggest that Mr. Eden is still not optimistic about securing a settlement in South-East Asia, and in the present prevailing atmosphere, outside of America, there is also no reason why he should not, with his sense of high diplomacy, bring it off. Both Sir Winston Churchill and Mr. Eden, supported by the majority of people in Britain, France and the Far East, prefer a settlement to a western dominated security pact, the Asian support for which would come from such highly suspect and unreliable quarters as South Korea, Formosa and Siam.

But how far can Britain go without the support of America? It is true to say that Mr. Eden's initiative from the start of the Geneva conference was applauded almost everywhere as a reaffirmation of sensible British leadership, but if the continuation of the Atlantic alliance is accepted as necessary, as in theory it no doubt is, then the US holds most of the trump cards. It can be argued that for one country to be so strong, in what is supposed to be a free alliance, that she can literally dictate terms is unhealthy. Nevertheless, it is a fact—just as much of one as that the Communist Government in China has the support of the overwhelming majority of its people—and relationships between nations in this small world must be tailored to fit existing facts and situations that could only be changed by upheaval and strife.

With the anti-Communist frenzy at a height in America now, when every projected agreement with a Communist country is called appeasement, and with Congressional elections due this autumn, the prospects for a settlement in Asia on which Great Britain, India, China and America could agree, seem very remote. Yet there must be a solution if this world is to rest easy. If America was allowed, by the acquiescence of her allies, to be as irresponsible in practice as her politicians and spokesmen are in their statements, the Far East would soon be rocking to the explosion of hydrogen bombs.

To meet this easily touched-off irresponsibility with something concrete is a task for which the British Commonwealth is admirably suited. There seems no reason why a settlement of peace in South-East Asia should not be guaranteed by Britain, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, together with Burma and Indonesia on the one hand, and China and the Viet Minh on the other. America could be left out entirely for the time being until saner and wiser counsels prevail.

Already many influential, but scarcely vocal, elements in the United States are showing concern that their country's all-out opposition to the influence of Communism in Asia is blinding it to the fact that among the people of Asia the United States is being counted among the greatest imperialistic nations in the history of the world. How not to support colonialism but at the same time oppose Communism is one of the most challenging dilemmas ever to lie beneath the surface of American policy. To be against Communism unreservedly and uncompromisingly to the

exclusion of all things else is to be, in the last analysis, against the peasantry of Asia.

For the British Commonwealth and independent Asian countries to secure a settlement would reassure the peoples of Asia that the US does not completely dominate the West, and that there was a willingness to protect the new and nascent Asia as much from rabid Americanism as from Communism.

Hopes for Indo-China

MUCH in the immediate future of South-East Asia depends on the kind of agreement the French conclude with the forces of Ho Chi Minh. The withdrawal by the French to a smaller area in the Red River Delta is the final recognition of the weight of support among the Vietnamese for the Viet Minh. Infiltration and pro-Viet Minh sentiment was so strong behind the French lines that the situation had become untenable. What now are the French claiming to defend? A town and a port essential to French commerce and a handful of Vietnamese, a great number of whom are already politically and spiritually outside the French perimeter.

There is no reason to doubt that M. Mendès-France, the French Prime Minister, is sincere in his desire to conclude an agreement before July 20, the deadline he gave himself when he took office, and he has denied that the French have been thinking along lines of partition.

In Geneva, during the last few weeks, the talks have been going quite well, and the toughest nut has been cracked with the Viet Minh agreeing to withdraw its forces from Laos and Cambodia. Other agreements on supervisory committees and arrangements for a cease-fire have been reached. It is the political settlement to come which is likely to cause more wrangling.

How far does M. Mendès-France agree that the French no longer have a place in Indo-China? If he is going to insist on France retaining certain areas, then the Viet Minh are going to disagree and step up their military offensive. As has been said before in these columns, the French must accept as graciously as possible that their tenure in Indo-China is finished, and their efforts now should be directed towards encouraging those nationalist elements on their own side to confer and work with the Viet Minh (for whose gravitation to Communism the French are largely to blame) towards a state which as near as possible meets the desires of the people of Indo-China. It is time the issue was settled. To do so could open up an era of confidence in Asia.

The Formosa Danger

IN accordance with our principle of impartiality we publish the article on Formosa (on page 21), although our contributor's observations represent only one point of view. They are even contradicted by a man like Dr. K. C. Wu, former Governor of Formosa and only up to two years ago one of the most influential men in Chiang

Kai-shek's *camarilla*, who complained last month in the American magazine *Look* that Formosa must be considered a police state. Also, *The Christian Science Monitor* reported that the Chinese Nationalists maintain a concentration camp on a bleak island off Formosa, where thousands of men and women who are suspected of Communist sympathies, are "brain-washed" behind barbed wire. Sentences to this re-indoctrination centre range from three years upwards, but regardless of the sentence, inmates are not released until they convince their instructors of their satisfactory "thought condition." Thus Formosa is using exactly the same methods which we are asked to condemn in Communist China.

Yet, regardless of the internal conditions of Formosa, there is no justification whatsoever of continuing with the imbecile farce of recognising it as the actual representative of the 600 million Chinese across the straits on the mainland. If the Nationalists were to confine themselves to sabre rattling and to regular announcements of forthcoming invasions of the mainland—which they have to do in order to maintain the spirit of the China lobby and the steady flow of funds—they could be forgiven. Bearing in mind their former defeats and their utter lack of popularity in China, they could be discounted as anything more than well armed local emigrés shouting their last war cries before being swept away by the inevitable tide of developments.

But, unfortunately, their childish play at piracy or, as they call it, "blockading the mainland," may well lead to serious international complications. Having molested British, Polish and other merchant vessels before, they seized the Russian tanker Tuapse on June 23 for carrying oil to the "Communist-bandit" port of Shanghai. At the time of writing, Formosa intends to confiscate the vessel and its cargo. The seizure was made on the open sea by the Chinese Nationalist Navy which operates destroyers and patrol craft loaned by the US. Soviet protests blame the United States Government, as the waters in which the incident took place is controlled by the US Navy and Air Force. If the Soviet Government, as it has indicated, takes steps to protect its merchant ships in that area, a delicate situation will have been created for which Taipeh as well as Washington are to blame and which harbours greater potentialities of international conflict than appear at the first glance. Under these circumstances, the latest remarks by General Van Fleet, President Eisenhower's special envoy, are particularly unfortunate. During his visit to Taipeh he said on July 4 that it was necessary to conclude a mutual defence pact between the US and Nationalist China since America has similar pacts with other Pacific nations. He added that the mutual understanding and cooperation between Formosa and the US had been gratifying and had, in fact, the same effect as an alliance. Among the free nations of the Pacific, the General said, Formosa was the strongest military potential and "the best equipped in morale."

If it is absolutely essential to maintain the Chiang Kai-shek arsenal, why not transfer it to more congenial and less vulnerable surroundings, like—say—Guatemala?

WESTMINSTER AND THE EAST

By Harold Davies, M.P.

THE Foreign Affairs debate on the Geneva Conference must be regarded as one of the most vital debates since the end of the war. An attentive and anxious House listened quietly to Mr. Eden telling them: "We have responsibilities and friends in South-East Asia, and I have seldom known a situation in which risks of a wider conflagration should be more apparent to all. We have, therefore, very good reasons for wishing this Conference to succeed." Some few hours before the Debate took place Members were provided with a thick White Paper on the Korea and Indo-China talks. Document No. 33 summarised the Korean situation as seen from the Sixteen Nations' point of view. "We believe, therefore, that it is better to face the fact of our disagreement than to raise false hopes and mislead the peoples of the world into believing that there is agreement where there is none . . ." Taken out of its context this is a sombre remark that can only be qualified by the fact that meanwhile the armistice in Korea continues.

The House of Commons has not been prepared to agree immediately to the establishment of a South-East Asia Treaty Organisation on the lines put forward by the United States. We still want the Geneva talks to succeed. If there is complete failure, then some form of Organisation in South-East Asia would be brought up for debate. There are Members, though, on both sides of the House who sincerely believe that no security could be guaranteed in South-East Asia without the cooperation of the Colombo Powers, and Mr. C. R. Attlee summed up the reactions of most of us when he said, during the debate: "I must say that sometimes it is awfully difficult to understand just what the American line is, as between what members of the Government say and what senators say, and sometimes what generals and admirals say."

The division within the American Administration seems clear to us over here. We see those who would be prepared to make war on China when and how they thought best, and we see another faction wanting to contain Communism without bestirring a third world war. Sir Robert Boothby brought the point home when he remarked: "The Communists did at long last put forward constructive proposals for a compromise. They were described on a Tuesday, I think it was, by Mr. Bedell Smith as 'restrained and sensible' and two days later by Mr. Robertson as 'unreasonable and unacceptable'; although in the interim there had been no change in the proposals." Sir Robert is continuously working for Anglo-American cooperation and understanding, but he criticised: "It is this sort of thing that gives rise to doubts as to whether the Americans really want a peaceful settlement of any kind. And I am quite sure that expression should be given to these doubts in this House."

Sir Walter Fletcher, Conservative Member for Bury

and Radcliffe, is a well-known authority on South-East Asian affairs, but, to say the least, he had some very startling points of view to contribute to the Debate. Sir Walter believed that it is fallacious to talk of any such entity as China. The men of north China who live on grain are totally different beings from the men of south China who live on rice. From these premises and the fact that the Central Government is in Peking and, according to Sir Walter, their success in the south due only to massacre and repression, he appeared to believe that we could by underground methods divide China against itself. "We have got to do one of the most difficult things for the people of this country to do in any way at all, and that is to adopt the same dirty methods against Communism as Communism itself uses." This to some of us appears to be the open road to World War Three.

Sir Walter was the voice of an "obsolete colonialism," but Mr. Eden had welcomed the opportunity of talks with Chou En-lai. "The contacts between the two delegations in Geneva were undoubtedly of value. I know there has been criticism of them in certain quarters, but in my opinion they have already proved of benefit to this country and a real contribution to peaceful co-existence, which is still our aim and object with every country." This was more in the spirit of the twentieth century and offered a chance to mankind. Or as Mr. Attlee said: "It is really a farce not to recognise the present Government of China as the effective Government of China."

The Debate seemed to indicate that we can no longer use mere words to hide the material facts about the upsurge of nationalism in South-East Asia. What is happening there can now be seen clearly as more than the mere manoeuvres of a few bandits. China, we are now told, has 603 million people, and as Mr. Attlee said: "One hears about Chinese imperialism. There is a danger. There is always a danger that a flushed nationalism may turn to imperialism. We saw recently that they have 603 millions to look after. Surely that is enough for any Government." Now we await the results and findings of the talks with Mr. Dulles and President Eisenhower. Mr. Eden talked of some kind of Locarno. The Locarno Treaty was concluded on November 16, 1925, between some of the European powers to maintain their mutual frontiers, and to abstain from the use of force. Russia was left out. Locarno failed! If we leave China out of a true defensive pact in South-East Asia then that too will fail. Let us remember that some 800 years before Caxton discovered how to print with pieces of wood the Chinese had developed the art. After 25 centuries of civilisation a European policeman once nailed up a crude notice outside the Park of the International Concession in Shanghai. "No Chinamen, No Dogs allowed." Those days are gone and no bullets will bring them back to Asia.

ASIA IN WASHINGTON

By David C. Williams (Washington)

IN the Indo-Chinese crisis, as on previous occasions, the Eisenhower Administration appears to have been trapped by its own rhetoric. Through the "new look" in military planning, people were told, the United States had for the first time since the War seized the "initiative" from the Communists, and could act at the time, at the place, and in the manner of its own choosing. Recent unhappy events have given fresh currency to the true story of what happened when the former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asked his barber how he thought things were going. "Well, sir," he answered, "since we got that initiative they all talk about, things haven't been so good."

Here are some instances of the many contradictory statements that high Administration spokesmen have made:

Blowing hot: "The Chinese regime should realise that a second aggression (into Indo-China) could not occur without grave consequences which might not be confined to Indo-China." (Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, September, 2, 1953.)

Blowing cold: "No one could be more bitterly opposed to ever getting the United States involved in a hot war in that region (Indo-China) than I am." (President Eisenhower, February 10, 1954.)

Blowing hot again: "A Geneva truce which would provide a road to a Communist take-over and further aggression (will mean) a need . . . even more urgent to create the conditions for united action in defence of the area." (Secretary Dulles, May 7, 1954.)

Cold once more: "Dulles now calls defence feasible without Indo-China; says South-East Asia can be held even if Associated States (Indo-China) are conquered." (*New York Times* headline on Dulles press conference, May 12, 1954.)

Whistling in the dark: "One of the greatest turning points of history confronts the United States and the rest of the free world . . . Basic decisions will have to be made within the next 30 days. Decisions whether South-East Asia is to be defended or is to go behind the Iron Curtain. Decisions whether we are to have a real defence system in the Pacific area or not. Decisions whether we are to go on talking in Genève while the Communists take over Hanoi, the Delta, and all Indo-China." (Senator Knowland, Republican Majority Leader in the Senate, June 5, 1954.)

Here one sees the Administration's rhetoric dissolving against two hard realities—the reluctance of Congress to endorse American intervention without substantial support from other nations; and the unwillingness of Britain and of the major Asian nations to embark upon the incalculable risks of an Indo-Chinese adventure. Behind Congress is a reluctant American people, whose letters to their Senators and Congressmen have run overwhelmingly against war;

and behind Churchill and Eden (as it's viewed here) is the fear of damaging political repercussions within Britain.

There was at first a tendency to cast Britain as the villain of the drama—and *Time* magazine, once Sir Winston Churchill's great and good friend, launched an attack upon him which for savagery exceeded even this frenetic magazine's previous onslaughts on statesmen who dared to disagree with it. The mood now has changed, and the American people are sincerely seeking enlightenment in a world which they find more puzzling than ever. One of the interpreters of Asia most esteemed by Americans, General Carlos Romulo of the Philippine Republic, has offered this advice: "You cannot save a people from Communism unless they want to be saved, and they will not wish to be saved unless you give them freedom as a better alternative to Communism."

The American approach to Asia, he suggested, should be based upon "the need to guarantee the enjoyment of the Four Freedoms by the peoples of South-East Asia, rather than the need for a military coalition against Communism." Such an Asian Charter, he said, could well be underwritten by the United States, and subsequently by other non-Asian countries with interests in the region (Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand), who could then pool their military resources in a common effort to safeguard free Asia. The objective, he said, should be "to stop Communism in its tracks by a convincing show of power—if necessary, by the actual application of force—and to do so with the consent and cooperation of the South-East Asian peoples concerned."

How to secure such consent is the question. Some State Department officials are much encouraged by the declaration of the Colombo Conference of Asian Prime Ministers of "their unshakable determination to resist interference in the affairs of their countries by external Communist, anti-Communist, or other agencies." Although the sting of the inclusion of the category "anti-Communist" is felt, the recognition of a potential threat to "the sovereignty, security, and political independence of their respective states" is regarded as significant.

The American Ambassador to India, George V. Allen, who has been in Washington to testify before committees of Congress on behalf of economic aid to India, has declared that India might undertake a defence alliance with its neighbours provided it felt that Asian nations were taking the lead. After discussing the disputes between the United States and India over such questions as military aid to Pakistan, Ambassador Allen added that he was certain that India would fight for its own independence, and "my guess is they would" fight for independent neighbours like Burma as well.

He said that the prospects for India's joining an Asian

defence system "would depend somewhat on how it came about . . . If they felt the Oriental powers themselves were leading, and we were merely backstopping non-aggression with our power and resources, I think they might."

These statements by Ambassador Allen were not casual and unpremeditated. They represent much behind-the-

scenes thinking and discussion in the State Department. There is growing recognition that the "little Asia" (Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, and Formosa) which has figured in previous American planning is not enough, and that, in spite of all the criticisms which have been made here of India's foreign policy, this great country is the natural and inevitable keystone of a free and secure Asia.

PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF INDIA

By the Hon. Emanuel Celler (House of Representatives, U.S. Congress)

THIS I can safely say after my recent trip to India. If you cannot succeed, once you are in India, in divesting yourself of western standards and measurements, then trust no judgement you make. In Bombay, an American woman, married to an Indian, said to me, "I have lived here twenty years and I am still fascinated and bewitched." And—she might have added, "bothered."

If I were to be limited to one word descriptive of India, I would choose, "vibrant." This, in the main, springs from the marriage of the ancient with the new. If we are to understand India at all, we must understand how the patience of antiquity mingles with the restlessness of our own age, like the slow lumbering of the water buffaloes through the streets of Indian cities while the automobiles rush past. Or, perhaps, this marriage is even clearer when we understand that the village spinning wheel is as important to the development of India as is the irrigation project, both of which are significant parts of India's five-year plan.

India, full of colour, full of movement, alive with men and women of searching, sensitive minds, bears a gruesome burden: hunger. India, only at the beginning of industrialisation, must maintain and sustain two and a half times the population of the United States in a country one-half the size. There is no hiding from the ugliness of hunger.

I would like to dwell, for a moment, on what the Indian leaders told me. A good part of every discussion was devoted to American-Indian relations. That they have deteriorated steadily and visibly for the past year cannot be denied. It pleased me that the Indians with whom I spoke refused to indulge in non-committal comment. In his directness, the Indian spares neither his own country, nor ours . . . mostly, of course, ours. These are the views, as nearly as I can summarise them:

1. The United States is naive.
2. The United States is frightened out of all proportion of the Soviet threat.
3. That a country like the United States, with its wealth and power is unbecomingly permitting itself to be manipulated by not only the colonial powers, but by a country like South Korea.
4. That by insisting upon labelling all aid as anti-Communist, the United States has convinced the recipients that they are being used merely as pawns in the East-West cold war. Would the United States extend

aid to help less fortunate countries and people were there no Communist threat? They doubt it.

5. That visiting Americans insist that receiving Governments bow low in praise and gratitude for the aid given. Such an attitude, they maintain robs the receiver of his pride and the giver of his grace. How would you like to be the poor nephew being constantly reminded by the rich uncle that *he* is sending him through school.
6. The United States is losing fast its civil liberties at home, and we are behaving like trapped animals in a cage held tight by Senator McCarthy.
7. That we are pushing China further into the bosom of the Soviet Union by our refusal to recognise her. Recognition is not approval, but the acknowledgement of the existence of a government which is conducting the affairs of that state.

These are the views I heard over and over again whether in Bombay, Agra, Jaipur, Delhi or Calcutta. For the sheer fun of it I would recite them every time some Indian began, "Now, Mr. Congressman, tell me why the United States . . ." This would start them laughing, but they held fast to their views.

We have neither of us moved forward to understanding. We have both failed. Our own failure is ironic. Anti-colonial, we stand accused of favouring colonialism. Welded firmly to the tradition that the individual is served by the state rather than the state by the individual, we stand accused of totalitarian practices. How did this come to pass? There are two roads, one positive, the other negative, which we have taken that have led to it. Our overriding consideration has been the threat of war, properly so, but, and this but is of the utmost significance, we have refused to recognise that a country may have external problems of her own apart from the East-West tension. For example, tension exists between Pakistan and India. When we speak of giving military aid to Pakistan and establishing bases there, India sees it in light of her relationship with Pakistan. We may say it is absurd for India to view Pakistan as a threat, but the fact is that she does. Pakistan views India as a threat, in her turn, spending 60 per cent. of her budget on the military, and admittedly, because of her fear of India who, relatively, is so much more powerful than she is. India asserts that she exists as a nation with an identity of her own, not just in

line with the East-West tug of war. She has her own shape, colour, form, and wants to speak with the voice and judgement that is her own. Does not freedom, she asks, mean freedom to make mistakes?

America's second road of failure has been not to acknowledge that an idea is on the march, an idea that no name calling, no war itself, can stop. The United States has long known that idea for herself. We have called it various names, such as equality of opportunity, democracy, the Four Freedoms, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That idea has marched painfully, slowly and even bloodily forward since the end of feudalism in the West. The oppression of the many by the few is the yoke the East seeks to lift from its shoulders. And it is to this idea that the Soviet Union, for its own sinister purpose, has addressed itself in the East. It is in this strain of idealism that the Soviet Union has found its most potent weapon. We, the United States, founded in idealism, pursuing a way of life in that idealism, have failed to identify ourselves with it abroad. It is the United States which has brought its idealism into action in these countries of the East through Point Four and economic assistance. The Soviet Union has done nothing about the poverty, the disease, the illiteracy; only pointed at it through a world-wide and centrally directed organisation. But we have won few hearts without aid, because somewhere along the line, despite its inherent nobility, expressed in the deed, it has become identified as a military manoeuvre. Our aid, I was constantly being told, was born out of desperation, not out of hope for a world arising.

India is so desperately in need of peace, so desperately in need of time to meet her own economic and social needs that I believe she has unfortunately forced herself into a state of mind which recognises no Soviet threat. If she can say with such assurance that the United States aggrandises such a threat, it can be said with equal assurance that India wishfully minimises it. Despite the invasion of Tibet, despite the steady infiltration of Communists into India through common borders, despite the fact that India has had to quietly remove Communists from sensitive government posts, despite the hard facts of Communist manipulation in the Korean prisoner issue, India openly acknowledges no threat. I have heard Indian leaders say, "We will fight if need be." The obvious question is, of course, with what? How militarily prepared can you be for a threat which to you does not exist? This insensitivity to Soviet aggression is, in my opinion, Mr. Nehru's blind spot.

The conversations I had with Mr. Nehru were a revelation to me. He did most of the talking in an engaging openness of manner. "Dynamic Neutralism," he called India's foreign policy, meaning that India will move as each situation demands, that she will not set herself in any rigid pattern and become its prisoner. "It is impossible," he said at one point, "that India's position has been misunderstood in the United States. There is no unbridgeable gap between the two countries. There are only differences in approach. Feudalism," he stated at another point, "is breaking up in the East. How shall

that process be accelerated?" The Communists propose force—revolution and then Kremlin domination. Nehru wants the change accelerated by democratic means. Because of this he has earned the enmity of the Communists. He is in no camp, so each camp assails him, the right and the left. Nehru, within his own mind, has set a neat little pattern . . . the West on one side, the Soviet on the other, and between them Mother India, leading each to shake hands with the other. The enigma of Nehru is that with his own keenly developed sense of values which always implies preferences and judgements, he has withdrawn to the frayed commonplace that every story has two sides, implying that each story has two sides *equally* wrong and *equally* right. Are there equal rights and wrongs in freedom versus tyranny?

I talked to Nehru about the refugee problem since that was one of my objects in visiting India. I believe that few of us in the United States understand the magnitude of the refugee problem faced by both Pakistan and India. Some 15 million people crossed from India into Pakistan and from Pakistan into India at the time of partition, 8 million going the first way and some 7 million the other. The bitterness over partition has not by any means evaporated, and the refugees in both countries who fled from riots and bloodshed are a constant reminder of the bitterness. Crossing still takes place, sometimes by as many as a thousand a week. In the beginning, the refugees settled on whatever land they could find, building their huts of sticks and mud, thousands upon thousands in a single colony. Very few came with any possessions at all. Most of them were untrained for the economy into which they were pouring. Both countries have started large housing projects for the refugees. In India, a training and educational programme is under way. The programme is split into many levels, from the training in weaving to the training in engineering skills. The refugees have added innumerable problems to problems already innumerable. Yet neither has asked for aid in their programme of housing, rehabilitation and education. They are struggling with a gigantic social and economic task. It is here, perhaps, that the western world, including the United States, can give evidence of its concern for humanity and for humanity's sake.

There are refugees, uncounted, throughout all of the East. The problem can be regionalised by all affected nations of the East combining in association to exchange knowledge, data, resources, drawn each from its own experiences and pooled for the common benefit of all. To such regional association, the western powers can give such aid as it deems able, proper and necessary. Such an association among these countries could work towards the dissolving of rivalries and enmities, ancient and new. It could lead to further regional cooperative efforts which would more surely spell peace for themselves and the world.

This is a job to be done with no axe to grind. This is a job to be done for and with people. The foes are poverty, disease, hunger; the conquerors, men and women of good will.

The Hon. Emanuel Celler is Representative for the 11th District, New York, in the Congress of the United States, Washington, D.C.

UNREST IN PAKISTAN

By our Diplomatic Correspondent

SINCE the crisis in East Pakistan at the beginning of last month, when the Karachi Government dismissed the United Front Ministry under Fazlul Huq, there has been little publicised reaction from East Bengal political leaders. When Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani, President of the East Pakistan Awami Muslim League, visited London just recently for health reasons, I was able to ask him a number of questions about the background to the crisis. The Awami (or People's) Muslim League is a breakaway from the original Muslim League, and was one of the parties of the United Front which won the elections in East Bengal some months ago. Maulana Bhasani, a small elderly man with close cropped hair and a luxuriant grey beard, is a devout Muslim who speaks only Bengali. He was not long ago released from Dacca jail, where he had spent 28 months without trial for his outspoken criticism of the Pakistan Government.

One thing is quite clear. The cause of tension between East Pakistan and the central Government under Mohammed Ali, is mainly agrarian and economic. The language issue is an expression of Bengali nationalism, which has come into prominence because more fundamental demands have been frustrated. Maulana Bhasani said that Karachi's statement that the riots and general dissatisfaction in East Bengal were attributable to Communist influence is quite untrue. Communism, as it is known throughout the world, is scarcely existent there. The Muslim religion, he claims, is antipathetic to Communism and forms a bulwark against it.

The trouble with East Pakistan is the same as with most of Asia: poverty and land starvation. With independence, other countries have enacted drastic reforms. Pakistan has not; or has not been drastic enough. Pakistan, said the Maulana, was created by the will of the Bengali landless peasants (97 per cent. in Bengal voted to secure the State of Pakistan in 1946, whereas in Sind, Punjab and other western areas the Muslim League could not muster 50 per cent. for it). And yet a few family groups continue to exploit Pakistan while the financial resources deteriorate. Jute is the main agricultural product of East Bengal, where 85 per cent. of the population are cultivators, the majority of whom do not own the land they work on. Business monopoly, according to Maulana Bhasani, forced the jute growers' prices down, but the costs of everyday necessary commodities have gone up to alarming heights.

The United Front was in favour of nationalising jute, but the central Government has not agreed to it. Another point of contention is that the Muslim League, with a strong controlling influence in Karachi, has not honoured its pledges about the zemindari system. Proposed compensation of 60 crores of rupees would fall ultimately on the hard-pressed peasantry.

On the question of American military aid to Pakistan, Maulana Bhasani ventured to say that there was general disagreement, not only in East Bengal but throughout Pakistan, with the Government's acceptance of it. Pakistanis think that it involves their country too closely in the world conflict. The basic foreign policy of Pakistan, the people think, should be one of non-intervention in global tensions. Strength on the surface is useless if the inside is weak and unstable. Although the Constituent Assembly in Karachi is a body which is not representative of feeling in the country, the Government did not dare to put the issue of military aid to it for fear of rejection. This, said the Maulana, is indicative of the Government's autocratic rule. The pressing need in Pakistan is to alleviate hunger and poverty, and no one, he said, accepts the official argument that more of the budget can be diverted to internal economic issues on the receipt of military aid. Before military aid, 65 crores of rupees were spent on defence and armaments. After military aid, 85 crores went for the same purpose.

Kashmir is a long way from Bengal, farther, emotionally, than it was when the troubles first began, and the Maulana had no firm ideas on what should be done there, other than to say that both Indians and Pakistanis could be less difficult, especially the Indians. The acceptance of military aid from America, however, has helped to increase Indian intransigence. Nevertheless, he thought that a free and fair plebiscite is not so remote as it seems.

It would appear from what the Awami Muslim League leader had to say that the rift between the people of Bengal and their central Government is very wide, and he maintained that the only solution is for the present Constituent Assembly in Karachi to be dissolved, and in its place there must be a new Assembly on the basis of wide adult suffrage. Pakistanis are unhappy that in the seven years since the creation of their country no constitution has been formulated, and Maulana Bhasani said that many of his countrymen think that if India and Indonesia have been able to adopt a constitution then Pakistan has no legitimate excuse to lag behind.

He denied that East Bengal has ever entertained the idea of breaking away from Pakistan, to become a separate state, but said that it demands complete autonomy and full and proper representation on the Constituent Assembly. Pakistan must meet the demands of the people of East Bengal—the majority of her population. The Maulana had the last word: "To depose a Ministry freely elected by the overwhelming majority of the people is a sad mistake and solves nothing for East Pakistan" he said. "The more people are oppressed, the more they will revolt, and that applies now in my country."

THE TWO PAKISTANS

By a Special Correspondent in Dacca

AT the time I write this the Dacca hospitals are filled with people wounded in the terrible slaughter at the Adamjee jute mills near Narayanganj (the port for Dacca) which occurred in mid-May. In addition to the uncounted wounded, more than a thousand are reported to have been killed. The immensity of the tragedy has shaken the people and Government of Pakistan and horrified all outside observers. There is no hiding the hideous atrocities which blood-crazy mobs will commit or the political and economic restlessness of which the trouble at Adamjee was a gruesome symbol.

Not since the communal violence which accompanied the partition of India in 1947 and which broke out again early in 1950 has murder on this scale taken place in Bengal, though earlier this year blood was shed during the rioting at the Chandraghona paper mills in Chittagong district. At partition and in 1950 it was Hindu against Muslim; today it is Muslim against Muslim, and what happened at Adamjee is making more people than ever ask themselves whether the bonds of a common religion and a common nationality are sufficient to make in any real sense one nation out of a country whose two segments are separated geographically by more than a thousand miles.

A commission has been appointed to discover what happened at Adamjee. In the meantime many stories circulate in Dacca; and if some of them are contradictory, they are not more so than the absurd statements issued by Pakistani leaders. Mr. Mohammed Ali the Prime Minister started it. Perhaps he had his American audience in mind and had recalled that the Pakistan-United States military pact was about to be signed. Whatever the reason, he told the world he had proof that the Communists were responsible for the trouble—and this long before people on the spot knew what had happened.

A scapegoat, of course, is always useful; and if there were not any Communists in the world we should probably need to invent them. In the East Bengal provincial elections earlier this year, four Communists secured seats, and since then Government members in Karachi have talked of the Communist menace in East Pakistan. The Central Government has sent intelligence officers to Dacca to report on radical activities, and a number of Communists even in West Pakistan have been placed under precautionary arrest.

The newly elected Provincial Government of East Bengal immediately denied through its Chief Minister, Mr. A. K. Fazlul Huq, that there was any Communist menace in East Bengal, and asserted that the Communists were not behind the rioting. Maulana Bhashani, leader of the East Pakistan Awami Muslim League, which played a major part in the United Front victory in March this year, said the trouble was the work of "reactionary elements." There were other bitter denunciations made

in the heat of the moment. Some said the defeated Muslim League instigated the riots to discredit the United Front Government; some said the firing was started by the mill guards and that the mill owners fomented the trouble to discredit the labour movement, for it is said that the labourers are too conscious of their rights since they helped to put the United Front into power. Wishful thinking came to the aid of rumour. One thing, however, seems clear. The riot took on a provincial form—Bengali against non-Bengali; and it is this terrible fact that hangs, a threatening cloud, over the future of Pakistan.

On the map the eastern segment of Pakistan looks tiny and insignificant compared with the extent of West Pakistan. It is easy to forget (if you don't live in it) that this tiny area has a population of more than 42 million compared with West Pakistan's 33.5 million; and provides, from the sale of jute, the greater part of the total national income. In spite of this, East Bengal has for a long time suffered the grievance of being treated like a poor relation. Not only has far more money gone out of the province than has come back to it for development purposes, and most of the best jobs in the country gone to non-Bengalis; but, even within East Bengal itself, Bengalis have found themselves at a disadvantage in seeking employment.

The other day I had an unemployed schoolmaster in to see me. He had been trying for a job in some of the big Dacca firms. "They won't take me," he said. "I'm a Bengali. All the big businesses here are owned by people from West Pakistan and they keep all the best jobs for non-Bengalis." This is a familiar complaint. Government departments are full of non-Bengalis, and there is a general feeling that to be a Bengali is practically a disqualification for the highest posts. In East Bengal's clubs, dining rooms and offices there is an invisible barrier between the cliques of Urdu-speaking Pakistanis from the West and the Bengalis. One cannot be surprised that the United Front in its election manifesto stressed the need for the recognition of Bengali as an official language and for more autonomy for East Bengal.

It is simple to say that the national interest must take precedence over provincial feelings; and since the Adamjee massacre there have been many appeals to the people to think of themselves as Pakistanis and not as Biharis or Bengalis. These appeals are clearly necessary. The difficulty is that there are genuine divergences of interest between the people in West Pakistan and those in the East. It is West Pakistan that is most interested in pacts with Turkey and America and most conscious of Islamic stakes in the Middle East; in East Pakistan the prevailing opinion is against American military aid. It is West Pakistan that is vitally concerned about Kashmir; and while no Bengali would be in favour of Kashmir's going

(continued on page 24)

NORTH AND SOUTH INDIA

By C. S. Venkatachar

(Secretary, Ministry of States, New Delhi)

THE unity of India is a passionate theme. The theorists of the Austrian Empire were wont to prove that Italy was a "geographical expression"; the Englishman, Sir John Seeley, asserted "that India is not a political name but only a geographical expression like Europe or Africa." Such a description was repudiated by an exposition of the fundamental unity of India's culture and civilisation amidst its prolific diversity—religious, ethnical, linguistic and so on. The fact to emphasise is that Indian geography has promoted as well as hindered the unity of India. There is a clear geographical separation between the north and the south of India, and from the remote past till modern times, the Vindhyas have proved an effective barrier of separation between the two regions. Is this separation superficial or is it deeper and more fundamental?

The differences between the north and the south of a country have often been discussed. One can profitably expatiate on how the Scottish north differs from the English south. What of America south of the Dixie line? Southern Italy presents quite a glaring contrast to the northern plains of Lombardy. China is "the largest cultural unit on the face of the planet"; yet there are some striking differences between Peking in the north and Nanking and Canton in the south. Similarly, the differences between the north and the south of India cannot escape notice. The north, that is the historic plains of Hindustan, is a vast stretch of unrelieved monotonous alluvium completely encircled on its northern boundaries for over 1,500 miles by the majestic Himalayas and watered by the rivers of the Indus and the Gangetic systems. The riverain civilisations of the north rose to great heights of achievement and splendour. Successive attempts to build round them a universal state embracing the whole country met only with a partial success. By contrast, the central tableland and the peninsular coastal areas of the south have diversified scenic beauties. The riverain systems on the eastern side of the peninsula with their three great deltaic areas are the focus of the ancient civilisations of the south where flourished the renowned southern kingdoms. These general physical differences have not constituted a major break in the social continuity and the cultural life of the two regions.

There is, however, a complete linguistic break between what is termed the Aryan or the Indo-European group of languages of the north and the Deccan and the agglutinative languages of the Dravida group. Such a major linguistic division should have proved a formidable barrier, hindering the unity of civilisation of the entire sub-continent, and should have set up wide cultural differences such as the Slavic, Teutonic and the Romance languages have done in Europe. Fortunately for India this has not happened. The manner in which India was able to achieve strong

cultural unity in the midst of regional diversities is a fascinating chapter of the linguistic history of India.

The Dravida languages represent a very high stage of development in the evolution of human speech. But from a very early stage of Indian history their role was confined to familial and social purposes, and the pride of place and primacy was given to the more dominant Sanskrit which was developed in the north. The general tendency among languages appears to be for the easiest and the socially more useful to supplant the more difficult or less useful. The Dravida-speaking people of the south met the most challenging cultural problem by choosing to be bilingual. The spread of Sanskrit as the vehicle of superior culture throughout the sub-continent is a primary contributory factor towards the unity of India. The physical type of the Aryan-speaking people was submerged in the somatic characteristics of the indigene. The lasting gift bequeathed by the Aryan-speaking people was neither a higher material culture nor a superior physical type, but a more excellent language and the mentality which generated it.

Under Moslem rule, the north was overlaid with a thick paste of Persian culture and Sanskrit ceased to be a living language. When politically India was divided into the Moslem-dominated north and the Hindu south, Sanskrit continued to be the cultural link between the two. The emergence of English under British rule as the common *lingua franca* only re-emphasised the previously well established principle that the unity between the north and the bilingual south can only be maintained by one language culturally so dominant that it is the highest vehicle for thought and culture.

This emphasis on the unification of India by a dominant language is neither a novel nor a fanciful view; it is rooted in the peculiarities of Indian history. It would be reasonable to expect that the great riverain Gangetic civilisation—the heart and seat of Indo-Aryan culture—would have attempted the physical unification of the south. That it did not do so is due to physical geography. The axis of the north Indian civilisation was from west to east and the population movement was lateral and not vertical. Little population pressure was exerted from the Gangetic regions on even the midriff of the continent, let alone the more distant south. In proof of this, we witness today the existence of tribal people in the confused jungles and hills of the central parts of India and of the process of the displacement of the tribal languages by the dominant Aryan languages. The north has not colonised the south by sending any considerable stream of migrants including warriors and renowned families. Except for a mad adventure of a Turkish ruler of Delhi, the capital of the northern kingdom was never once shifted to the southern parts.

In these respects India's experience has been different from that of China. There was for many centuries a dense population and high civilisation in the basin of the Yellow river from which Chinese colonists appear to have moved southward, subjugating the land for agriculture and assimilating culturally the indigenous inhabitants. The bulk of the people of China as we know today dwell to the south of the original homeland of the race. In China's history there has been a southward movement of the people as well as a southward shift of the capital of the Empire—such as in times of the inroads of the barbarians in the north.

Aryavarta—the sacred land of the Indo-Aryans—is traditionally described as lying between the Himalayas and the Vindhyas. Its geographical location was the central portion of the northern regions. It lacked balance. The north-western region of India was constantly subjected to cultural erosion and the ebb and flow of the cultural tide from the Central midlands to this region depended upon the pressure of the nomads from Central Asia. In a sense, Aryavarta was the cultural "heartland" of India. It would have been cut off from the outside world but for the perspective and balance furnished by the peninsular south. The people of the west and the east coasts of India promoted oceanic voyages and established contacts with India's neighbours. This made it possible to spread India's culture far beyond the confines of Aryavarta. The balancing factor of peninsular India is a permanent feature of Indian geo-politics. When the Tamil poet sang of "the thriving

town of Muchiri (modern Cranganore) where the beautiful large ships of the Yavanas bringing gold came splashing the waters of Periyar and returned laden with pepper," and when the Buddhist Jatakas spoke of the adventures and voyages of Indian merchants to far off Alexandria in the Roman west and Champa in the Far East—they both were proclaiming the unity between the north and the south.

If you take any text book of Indian history, you will see how the political dichotomy between north and south is laid bare. The history of north and south is unintelligently divided into two separate unrelated worlds—of kings, dynasties and chronicles. A point which has received little attention is the differing courses of the historical processes in the two regions and their imprint on the minds of the people. What is the most significant difference in the historical experiences of north and south? North India experienced recurrent invasions of the barbarians from Central Asia. No intruder entered the south till the western mariners founded tiny settlements on India's sea boards. The challenge which the north had to face was of a different character and magnitude, though it undoubtedly showed great resilience in assimilating the alien elements.

We have yet no clear idea of the profound effect of the alien impacts on the structure of Indian society. Certain it is the glorious mansion of Hinduism in the days of its pristine glory was forced to admit many socially undesirable tenants. The north had no respite from the processes of racial assimilations and the consequential social adjustments.

RAFFLES HOTEL

SINGAPORE

THE BEST KNOWN HOTEL IN THE FAR EAST

The Elizabethan Grill

Provides the best food
and the most delightful atmosphere in town

Orchestral or dance music
nightly in spacious ballroom

EVERY MODERN COMFORT—
AIR CONDITIONED ROOMS

Manager: F. SCHUTZMAN

Cables: "RAFFLOTEL"



The earlier pagan barbarians who had plagued the north for several centuries reappeared after the 12th century under the crusading banner of militant Islam. A united Western Christendom fought in the Middle Ages the politics of Arabian Islam. Islam reached China in the Tang dynasty, and the Moslem population in China was replenished at intervals by small streams of migration from Turkistan. Islam in China "has had to conform to Chinese notions of the place of religion in the State." The Chinese Moslem communities today have been politically assimilated without losing their cultural identity. It was a divided India which confronted the politics of Islam. The north unaided by the south had not the strength nor the defence in depth to deal with the Islamic onslaught. The political fragmentation between north and south was complete during this period.


The odds in the fight against Islam were heavy because India failed to deal with the Turkish marauders from the 12th to 16th centuries with the moral resources of the country as a whole. Hinduism in the north had to fall back on a long process of attrition in time and in numbers. The politics of Indian Islam met this challenge by fortifying the Moslem religion with the culture of Persian language and equipping itself with a strong protective cultural armour against the insidious inroads of dominant Hinduism. It is true a kind of synthesis of culture took place in the north, the so-called composite culture—an imperfect blend of Hinduism and Islam—somewhat narrowly restricted to political and social purposes. Islam remained an unassimilable force and it has been aptly put that "the sponge of Hinduism failed completely to absorb it."

Consequently, there was a long period of incessant duel between the Hindu and the Islamic minds. Loss of political freedom apart, the Hindu soul was badly seared; there was obvious cultural degradation. The Hindu, in mind and spirit, had to renew himself if he had to survive. Hindu revivalism in the north expressed itself largely in the Bhakti cult and religious emotionalism to give strength and sustenance to a withering soul. It is not without meaning and significance that all movements of revivalism and renaissance in the Islamic period and in the 19th century have been confined to the north with little application to or influence on the south.

During the long periods of trials and tribulations in the north, the south remained culturally most stable. There was no inner conflict in the mind of the southerner for the northern conflict had little repercussions in the south except perhaps in some parts of the Deccan tableland. The south settled down to a long period of the Hindu way of life, the traditional forms of which were enforced rigorously by the Brahmanical hierarchy with all the authority and prestige of the ancient law-givers of the Aryan north. Thus it came about that the south was able to retain in a large measure a mature and poised mind, able to assess the fundamentals with rationality and without any frustration. Elsewhere, wherever the conflict between Hinduism and the alien forces was intense, the resulting clash of culture and the contact of races developed a split personality.

Collector's Treasure

This strange coconut spoon comes from New Guinea. The handle is a fetish figure, the features being filled in with powdered chalk.



★ From the Elser Collection

53

LIPTON'S TEA

Connoisseur's Pleasure

Western observers in dealing with the revolt of the Asians from the shackles of western colonialism and the problems of the impact of western civilisation on Asian countries assume, in the context of Indian conditions, that English liberalism brought about a psychological malaise amongst the educated Indians; that western culture introduced friction and instability in the Indian mind and was responsible for turning the Indian into a pathological egoist who had completely lost roots in his own native soil, and also that English as the *lingua franca* doomed the Indian to the disadvantage of a bilingual life. These views, even granting their validity in some form, require to be modified and restated. It is sufficient here to say that the single force for India's recovery was her strong nationalism which utilised western ideas, language and thought not only to overthrow the West but to apply certain palliatives and correctives to a deep-seated malaise and instability of mind, long antedating the western impact on India.

Within the framework of a universal civilisation, shaped and conditioned by history and geography, there have always been two foci of culture in India. The north and south have never been divided on a mutually antagonistic basis. The north has not dominated the south. The cultural life of north and south has existed on a co-ordinated basis and jointly, never separately but always in unison, have they promoted the fundamental unity of India.

FRENCH SETTLEMENTS IN INDIA

By G. S. Bhargava

BERNARD SHAW once said the British Empire was "quite unintentional." To many of us in India, the statement sounded more "Shavian" than true. How could an empire "built on the blood of our people" and "maintained with bayonets" be unintentional, we asked ourselves. But the climax (or was it anti-climax?) of the drama of British rule over India vindicated G.B.S. The sun set on the Empire as quietly and eventlessly as it does at every dusk. The largest and the richest extra-territorial possession any metropolitan country had was scuttled without as much as the shedding of a tear or the batting of an eyelid!

While the vast British Empire might be unintentional, its tiny crumbling, chaos-ridden French counterpart can never be called so. This is proved by the record of events in Indo-China, the trouble in Tunisia and Morocco and, above all, the breakdown of the Paris negotiations on the French Indian Settlements. In Indo-China, Communism provided the Quai d'Orsay with a pretext to continue waging losing battles against nationalist aspirations there. In the relatively minute French Indian possessions, on the other hand, there is no Communism, because the Communists there were till recently some of the staunchest supporters of French rule. In this connection, *Communist*, the monthly journal of the Indian Communist Party, in its issue of June-July, 1949, took the Pondicherry Communists to task "for having shamelessly advocated remaining inside the French imperialist union." Nevertheless, France still refuses to hand over control of these possessions.

The French "Empire" in India has an aggregate of 195-90 square miles with a total population of 362,000. Originally, it was made up of four parts, but Chandernagore, with a population of 45,000, ceded to the Indian Union on October 6, 1947. A referendum held on June 19, 1949, ratified the merger by 7,473 votes to 114.

Pondicherry, the biggest of the French possessions in India, is 115 square miles in area and has a population of 223,000 spread over its eight communes. About a hundred miles by road to the south of Madras, Pondicherry was founded by François Martin in 1674. It was captured by the Dutch in 1693 but was restored to the French six years later. The British East India Company besieged it four times, but ultimately it came back to French hands as a result of the Treaty of Paris of 1814.

Divided into eight municipal communes, the territory of Pondicherry is neither contiguous nor continuous. Four enclaves consisting of 12 "islands" of French territory, surrounded by and separated from the headquarters of Pondicherry by Indian territory, constitute the Settlement. The Indian Postal and Telegraph Department has jurisdiction in all these enclaves which are linked with the rest of the country by India Government railways only. Even electricity Pondicherry gets from Madras, from the Mettur hydro-electric power system. Thus, in addition to close economic and cultural ties with the rest of India, in respect of vital spheres of administration also, the Settlements are more Indian than French.

Karaikal, the second largest of the Settlements, is also on the east coast. Its area of 53 square miles is divided into six municipal divisions and is inhabited by 70,000 people. Pondicherry and Karaikal are linguistically in the Tamil area and the people speak Tamil, like their Indian compatriots across the border. Compared to the impact and prevalence of English in the rest of India, the influence of French is negligible. Also on the east coast, Yanam is the tiniest of the French possessions, with an area of 5.5 square miles. Its population of 5,853 is Telugu-speaking.

On the west coast is solitary Mahe, with an area of 22.85 square miles and a population of over 18,000. Malayalam is the language spoken here.

The Indian rupee is the ordinary legal tender in all these Settlements. The paper currency issued by the local branch of the

"Banque de l'Indochine" is current only in Pondicherry town and even here it is not very popular. In fact, the local merchants had some time ago appealed to the authorities to withdraw it from currency as it had lost its value, as far as day-to-day monetary transactions were concerned.

The total revenue of the Settlements is Rs. 122 lakhs a year, which is much less than that of a big-sized municipality in India. Excise and customs levies contribute a lion's share of the revenue, while the other sources are land revenue and income-tax, which together raise Rs. 13.5 lakhs a year.

In 1941, a customs union agreement was entered into between the then Government of India and the French India authorities, whereby in return for the payment of an annual subsidy by the Government of India, the French India administration handed over customs jurisdiction over the area to the former. Thus, for purposes of import-export regulations and customs levy, the Settlements virtually became a part of India, though the arrangement did not work satisfactorily. The customs union agreement ended in April, 1949, and for purposes of customs the Settlements are now considered as foreign territory by India.

During the British period, especially before the customs union agreement was entered into in 1941, the French Settlements were providing asylum to all those who defied the British Indian laws, whether it be for personal or political reasons. For instance, Aurobindo, the savant-turned-revolutionary of Bengal, as well as lesser lights from South India, sought refuge in Pondicherry from political persecution in British India. Smuggling was another anti-British activity and the French Settlements provided ample scope for it. Lastly, orthodox Hindus who wanted to get over the age of consent stipulation in the marriage law known as the "Sarada Act," enforceable in British India, used to find a haven in these Settlements for the performance of child marriages. Thus, the French Settlements were then more useful than otherwise for many Indians and this was essentially the reason why the nationalist upsurge in these territories was generally on a small scale.

The end of British rule over India did not make much difference as far as the French Settlements were concerned. Politically, the dawn of Indian independence stirred the people of the Settlements into spontaneous action for merger with the rest of India, but the quiescence of the Government of India and the official recognition granted by the latter to the French hold on these areas (an Indian consulate was established in Pondicherry) made the spasm of emotion exhaust itself in being felt. In fact, in August, 1947, the French were actually preparing to follow in the footsteps of the British, but when they found the new Government in New Delhi was not very serious about the amalgamation of the possessions with the rest of India they took no further action.

As it is now a free port, Pondicherry is a smugglers' paradise, and it is here that the continuance of French control over these territories pinches India economically. Smuggling goes on both ways, to the double detriment of India. Essential commodities in short supply in the French possessions are imported on the sly from the adjacent Indian territory and goods whose export is banned in India are also sent abroad through Pondicherry. In return, diamonds, gold, watches, fountain pens, liquor, etc., which are all subject to customs levy, are smuggled into the Indian Union, depriving the Indian Government of its legitimate revenue and, at the same time, making it necessary for India to maintain a costly, but in no way fool-proof, customs cordon.

In 1951-52, Indian customs officials seized Rs. 147,426 worth of diamonds, Rs. 925,786 worth of gold, Rs. 68,452 worth of fountain pens and Rs. 27,338 worth of liquor, while they were being smuggled into Indian territory. That smuggling still remains the most lucrative business in the Settlements proves that much must be escaping the

customs. It is no exaggeration to say that all those interested in the perpetuation of French control over these territories are beneficiaries, direct or indirect, of the smuggling racket. This applies to French, French Indian and Indian nationals as well. There are many Indian merchants across the border who have an interest at stake and who have been financing activities calculated to postpone, if not avoid altogether, the merger of these Settlements with India. It has even been asserted that highly placed French officers in the French Indian administration are in league with these merchants through local agents.

Actually, France derives little profit from these Settlements. The French tax-payer, on the other hand, contributes Rs. 10 lakhs annually to the French India exchequer in the shape of salaries of top French officials, like the Commissioner, the administrators, the judges, the officers of the police and the military and so on. Unlike the Portuguese Settlement of Goa, the French possessions are not strategically important or viable. In the event of a war, if France tries to make use of these Settlements as bases, India can justifiably and without much difficulty amalgamate the tiny areas of land with the rest of the country.


The administration in the Settlements leaves much to be desired. The French India Government is unable even to police the territory and maintain law and order, let alone undertake development and public welfare projects. For instance, since March last, many of the Pondicherry communes and villages have declared their independence. In spite of the pressure of the Indian people, the Indian Government has refused to interfere in the matter and accept these areas into the Indian Union. Nevertheless, the Pondicherry authorities have not been able to regain control of these communes and villages. Instead, terrorists are indulging in depredations on adjacent Indian territory. Subsidised by influential smugglers the raiders carry out their pillaging without interference. They have made it unsafe for any person sympathetic to the merger idea to stay in French India.

A contrast with the conditions under British rule in India is justified here. At the height of the "Quit India" struggle in 1942 and on similar occasions earlier, there was terrorisation and repression in British India, but never were hooligans let loose on towns and villages to mete out punishment to political opponents. Nor was the administration, even in the East India Company days, ever unable to deal with hooliganism. In French India, on the other hand, 350 major cases of arson, assault and hooliganism have been on record between 1949 and 1952. Since March last, the tempo of these activities has increased, corresponding to the intensity of the demands for liberation.

A strange mixture of politics and profit provided the French with an argument for retaining their hold on these territories, but four months ago even that foothold was lost with the defection of the French India Socialist Party leaders. In no way connected with either the Indian Socialist Party or the French Socialists, the French India Socialists are a group of careerists who were in positions of power until recently. The elections held in October, 1948, were hopelessly rigged. The election rules and procedure made a mockery of democracy, allowing contestants to act as presiding officers in polling stations. The ballot papers were printed by the parties themselves and officials were allowed to take an active part in the elections, so long as they assisted the ruling French India Socialist Party. There was no provision for scrutiny of nomination papers or verification of credentials of candidates.

In addition, other parties were not allowed the elementary freedom of propagating their views, and the ruling party broke up opposition meetings and struck terror into the hearts of their supporters. The result was that the Socialist Party candidates were returned with large majorities.

Jean Rous, a noted French writer, writing about the conditions in French India in the issue of *Franc Tireur* of December 26, 1950, said: "... there is (in French India) a party which is ludicrously called the Socialist Party, which has christened its privileges and profits French sovereignty, and which indulges in a frenzied blackmail and is free to go tomorrow with bag and baggage with the clan of adversaries of French culture. ... It is likely that a few frenzied individuals would like to have a referendum in the Algerian or Oriental fashion intended to ensure the victory of France.



But such a victory would be the defeat of what can still be saved : our cultural effulgence."

M. Goubert was awarded the Legion of Honour by the French Government and was made a Minister in French India, which post he resigned three months ago. He was the main prop of the French administration until suddenly he and his colleagues reversed their political stand and expressed themselves in favour of a merger of the Settlements with India, without a referendum. It was a rude shock to Paris, whose turn it was now to denounce M. Goubert as a careerist and an opportunist.

The defection of M. Goubert and his colleagues was no doubt not free of personal motives. It was said that some audit objection was made against certain financial transactions undertaken by them as Ministers and that a scandal was threatened. So, it was explained, the Ministers overnight turned nationalists, thus ensuring a cosy future after the inevitable transfer of control to India. But this could not be the full story. Without sufficiently strong reasons, political or personal, the Commissioner of the French Indian Settlements would not have decided to drop M. Goubert and his friends. There must be other more weighty factors which time alone will reveal.

However apart from M. Goubert's party and the undependable French India Communists, there is a widespread nationalist movement, led mainly by Socialist-minded youth. These young men derive inspiration and guidance from the Indian Socialists and are impatient with the halting and conciliatory attitude of the Government of India.

This survey will not be complete without a brief reference to the recent Paris negotiations and their background. According to an agreement entered into between the Government of India and the French India authorities on June 8, 1948, the people of the French Settlements were to decide whether they would join India or remain under the French. A two-fold programme (for a referendum) was

laid down : (1) to hold fresh municipal elections all over the territory, and (2) later, to convene a combined meeting of all the municipal assemblies to decide on the date of the referendum. The elections of October, 1948, were supposed to fulfil the first part of the referendum procedure. Since, as a result of those elections, the pro-French Socialist Party had obtained control of all the municipal assemblies, the French started insisting on the next step, the referendum to decide the merger issue. New Delhi, on the other hand, refused to recognise the elections, regretting that it had entered into the 1948 Agreement.

In a technical and legal sense, India's case was weak because having once agreed to the referendum it could not go back on its word. But it was a strong point in India's favour that the way the elections were conducted went against the spirit of the agreement. The defection of M. Goubert and his friends turned the tables on the French and put India in an advantageous position. On March 18 last, the hitherto pro-French members of the municipal assemblies in Pondicherry and Karaikal unanimously decided that the Settlements should be transferred to Indian control without a referendum. This fulfilled the second part of the 1948 Agreement.

The French have now found a new argument in support of a

referendum, namely that Article 27 of the French Constitution precludes any cessation, exchange or addition of territory without the prior consent of the population concerned. India has countered this argument with a proposal that there should be an immediate *de facto* transfer of administrative authority in the Settlements, prior to and separate from the *de jure* transfer of constitutional sovereignty.

A compromise between these two standpoints was sought during the Paris negotiations. France visualised some sort of condominium in the Settlements, with India and France sharing administrative responsibility. But this offer was hedged in by a proviso that effective authority would be wielded by the French, with Indian officials playing a junior role. The proposal was not acceptable to India.

India's compromise proposal was the immediate *de facto* transfer of power, followed by some sort of a referendum to finalise the *de jure* constitutional arrangements, to get over the implications of Article 27 of the French Constitution.

However, no lasting solution of the French India problem is possible unless the central idea of transfer of authority to Indian hands is accepted by the French Government.

MYTHS ABOUT FORMOSA

By W. G. Goddard

SINCE arriving in the United Kingdom a few weeks ago from Formosa, I have been amazed at the crooked thinking about conditions there, so prevalent among those who should be better informed. I could never have believed that such ignorance of the facts existed here. The questions that have been put to me have so astonished me that I propose to answer the more important in these pages. Evidently myths pass for truth with so many people who regard themselves as well-informed.

1. Have not the mainlanders who fled to Formosa since 1949 dominated the island and its native-born people?

All the facts and figures give their own answer to this myth. However, we must keep in mind that apart from the 100,000 aborigines of Malay origin, the natives of Formosa are Chinese. They are descendants of migrants who crossed over from the mainland at different periods from the time of the Sui dynasty (A.D. 581-618) to the seven large-scale crossings during the Ming dynasty (A.D. 1368-1644). Of the 21 directors of local government in Formosa, only two are recent arrivals from the mainland. Of the 55 members of the Provincial Government, three are mainlanders, one is aborigine, the remainder are native-born Chinese. When the mainlanders first fled to Formosa there was some animosity on the part of the native-born, but that has completely disappeared as the native-born Chinese now control the local affairs of the province.

2. Is not the old Chiang clique still very active in Formosa?

As far as I could discover during the months I spent in Formosa there is no such thing as a clique of any kind. The men in control of national affairs are comparatively

young men. There is not one Cabinet Minister over 52 years of age, the majority being well under that figure. I did not hear the slightest whisper of political corruption. I saw a good deal of those Ministers in their offices and homes and found them to be vigorous minds and regarded by the people as conscientious and efficient officials. These men had no connection with the disastrous events on the mainland. They are not weeping over the mistakes there but are working for the future. I made exhaustive enquiries and am of the opinion that government in Formosa is as clean as in this country or in my own Australia. The men who belonged to the group called the "old Chiang clique" are in America, not Formosa. President Chiang might have sought security abroad but he would not desert his country in its hour of need. I talked with him in Formosa and was profoundly impressed. I talked with farmers and industrial workers who hold him in the highest regard. However, there is no Chiang clique, old or new, in Formosa.

3. Is not Formosa a police state?

The answer is very definitely "no." I went to Formosa at my own expense because I was anxious to see the position there. For years I had been convinced that the future security of my own country, Australia, depends, in no small measure, on what happens in China. Ever since I lived on the China mainland, I knew that Australia's front line of defence runs through that country. When I arrived at the Taipei airport, there were the usual customs questions, but I entered Formosa as easily as I came to Britain. During the months I spent there, I travelled from Keelung in the north, through Tainan, Taichung, to the industrial area of Kaoshiung in the south. I talked with Cabinet Ministers, farmers, industrial workers, and I was not questioned once as to where I was going. There

The author was formerly Professor at West China Union University, Chengtu, Szechwan, China. Later, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, Australia.

was not the least interference. And everywhere I found the people to be as free as here in Britain. They enjoy political freedom, and from the articles I read in the papers I was convinced that the Press is free. I broadcast twice over short wave and was not asked to present a script. Lawyers in practice assured me that the judiciary is completely divorced from politics. I presume that Formosa, like other countries, has its security service, but I saw nothing of it. I was asked if I had any suggestions to offer as to improvements. These were printed in the daily Press. I do not hesitate to affirm that the people of Formosa are as free as we Britishers.

4. Is not Formosa run by one political party, the Kuomintang?

This is another of those prevailing myths that die hard. Actually, there are more political parties there than in either Australia or Britain. Of these there are three major parties. The Kuomintang, which is short for "Chung Kuo Tang" or Chinese National Party, is the strongest of the three. In Formosa it relies for 40 per cent. of its membership on the farmers and industrial workers. Next comes the Democratic Socialist Party, the objective of which, as the name implies, is Socialism. The leader of this party, Chiang Yun-tien is a Minister without portfolio. Then comes the Young China Party with 17 members in Parliament. Dr. Tsiang, the permanent representative of Free China at the United Nations, has never been associated with the Kuomintang. The committee charged with speeding up preparations for the regaining of the mainland comprises members of these parties as well as Independents. Vice-President Chen Cheng and Chang Chi-yun are Kuomintang members; Mo Teh-yui and Wang Yun-wu are Independents; Tso Shun-sheng belongs to the Young China Party, while Hsu Fu-lin represents the Democratic Socialists.

Local government elections in Formosa, like those in Australia and Britain, are fought, unfortunately, on party lines. At this month's election in Taipei, the capital of Formosa, the Kuomintang-sponsored candidate for the mayoralty was defeated by an Independent. Whilst on this question of local government, it is interesting to note that at the last elections, the percentage of enrolled persons who voted was strikingly high. In Tainan district, 94 per cent. of those entitled to vote did so. In several other districts the figure was in the eighties, whilst the lowest percentage in any district was 74 per cent.

5. But, does not America really occupy Formosa?

America has given and continues to give considerable aid to Formosa, but only in strategic materials and the training of military personnel. But if occupation implies interference in government or the presence of armed forces, then it is just plain nonsense to talk about America occupying Formosa. In fact, only such persons as have never been there could imagine such a state of affairs. USA (Mutual Security Agency) and CUSA (Council for United States Aid) are instruments of economic cooperation, while MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group) concerns itself with the supply of war equipment and the

training of military personnel. America is merely doing the same in Formosa as in some other countries for the purpose of maintaining freedom in the Pacific. I know that Australians are appreciative of what America is doing, and all this ill-founded criticism of America as "imperialistic" has no support from my country.

6. Is not the living standard in Formosa the lowest in East Asia?

I know something of Indonesia, Indo-China, the China mainland, and Japan, and I believe living conditions in Formosa are higher than in any of these. Formosa holds the record for the greatest percentage of farmers owning or in process of owning their own farms. That is, in proportion to the number on the land. This is the result of the agrarian reform policy inaugurated by Chen Cheng when Governor of Formosa. Although the reform had operated only a few years, at the end of last year 300,000 families had been placed on their own farms, and when the final stage of the plan is completed it is estimated that 250,000 more families will have farms of their own.

Minister of Economics, Chang Tze-kai, assured me that this agrarian reform had been the main factor in raising living standards by 30 per cent. This figure may be too high or too low, but during the three months (December, 1953-March, 1954) I was in Formosa, I did not see one beggar anywhere, man, woman or child. Can this be said of any other Asian country? In the farming areas through which I went, talking to the farmers, I saw thousands of brick cottages that had taken the place of the old huts with thatched roofs and every cottage had electric light. I was inside a number of these, and although they had not the amenities we enjoy, they were, nevertheless, far ahead of anything I have seen elsewhere in Asia.

I spent some considerable time among the industrial workers in the Kaoshiung district, and talked with the workers at the chemical plant, the sugar mills, the petroleum and aluminium works and others. Each of these industries has its own doctor and hospital to serve the workers and their families. Homes are provided for married employees and hostels for those who are unmarried. There are rest and recreation rooms with libraries. Playing fields are attached to each plant. The workers are insured against accident, sickness, and their families in the case of the death of the worker. I am recording what I have seen not something I have read about. Can any other country in Asia equal such conditions?

I hold no brief for Formosa. Many things could be better, especially in the field of sanitation. I could suggest many improvements. But as Asian countries go it is far ahead of all others in its democratic institutions and its economic security. As a Britisher who believes in fair play and honesty in appraising others, I want to scotch those false ideas about Free China so prevalent here in Britain and shatter those myths that so many seem to delight in cherishing. Better still, I suggest that more Britishers go to Formosa and see things for themselves as I saw them.

EUROPEAN REFUGEES IN CHINA

The first group of European refugees in China passing through Hong Kong on their way to Europe (United Nations).



A GROUP of some 15,000 refugees of European origin in China are looking towards the international community for help in their difficulties. The High Commissioner for Refugees, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and the Voluntary Agencies succeeded through joint action in resettling 4,679 of them during the period February, 1952, to March, 1954. Since the beginning of 1954 the figures have a marked downward trend, mainly caused by a change in the administrative procedure of the Chinese in granting exit permits and which may be of a temporary nature only. Funds for the resettlement operation are low, so are the funds for the care and maintenance of refugees inside China and for their accommodation while they are in transit in Hong Kong. A beginning has been made with the settling in homes and institutions and sanatoria in Europe of the 860 known cases of old and sick refugees in Shanghai. Arrangements have been made for 305 of these "difficult cases" and the first groups have already arrived in Europe. Apart from the anxiety and difficulties in planning caused by the shortage of funds, the operation carried out jointly by the Office of the UNHCR and ICEM with the energetic cooperation of the voluntary agencies is continuing steadily.

The exact number of refugees of European origin in China is not known. The figures quoted are put between 14,000 and 18,000. Both figures are, in fact, estimates, since no census can be taken; they are based on the number of applications received from refugees by the joint UNHCR and ICEM office and by the Representative of the World Council of Churches in Hong Kong, and on information gleaned from refugees on their way to new lands.

Many refugees of European origin went to China either shortly after the Russian Revolution or later when Hitler came to power. They were helped in their efforts to establish themselves by the fact that foreigners in China, irrespective of their legal status or nationality, could settle in trade or business or find work as experts in industry or as employees on the Manchurian Railways. Most of these refugees succeeded in building up a decent and useful life in the community. This will explain why many of the refugees of European origin were reluctant to leave the country while the outcome of the revolution was still uncertain, hoping that eventually it would not be necessary for them to seek new lands of refuge.

The Japanese occupation and World War II reduced many to poverty. During the immediate post-war period the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) dealing with Displaced Persons in Europe, was also given the task to help the refugees in China, who after the downfall of Hitler wished to return to Europe, or who had been reduced to destitution by war events in the Far East and wished to resettle elsewhere.

The International Refugee Organisation (IRO) took over this task after the demise of UNRRA. The revolution and the advance

of the Communist armies towards the coast caused the first important wave of evacuation. Many thousands were convinced that under the new regime the position of foreigners and of refugees in particular would become intolerable.

By the end of 1948 a great number of refugees of European origin had gathered in Shanghai, from where the IRO was directing its resettlement operations. Large groups, however, remained in the north, especially around Harbin. With the Communist armies approaching Shanghai, an emergency programme was put into operation to evacuate particularly the White Russians, who were believed to be the most exposed group. The Philippine Government agreed to accept 6,000 of them in the Island of Samar, but only 4,000 could be transported, the evacuation being interrupted by the Communist advance.

When IRO ceased its activities in January, 1952, there were still 3,800 refugees registered with that organisation in Shanghai and awaiting resettlement. Of this number, 1,955 received financial assistance. The IRO in liquidation transferred \$235,000 to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to continue this assistance programme for a period of six months; it also transferred \$500,000 to ICEM with which to continue the resettlement operation. The UNHCR and ICEM set up a joint office in Hong Kong, and 878 refugees were resettled between February 1 and December 31, 1952. By November, 1952, the IRO Trust Fund for care and maintenance was exhausted and the cost of continuing to look after the IRO registered refugees had to come out of the United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund (UNREF) largely at the expense of the High Commissioner's assistance programme in Europe. The IRO fund for the movement of refugees given to ICEM had also run out before the end of 1952 but ICEM was able to form with other IRO liquidation assets a new fund of \$1m. on which it could draw for its operation in China. These new moneys were, however, to serve not only for the refugees in China but for the movement of all European refugees living outside Europe. At the end of 1953 ICEM launched a new call for finances with which to continue this programme.

The combined efforts of UNHCR and ICEM and the Voluntary Agencies resulted in 1953 in the resettlement of 3,321 refugees in new lands. In December, 1953, more than 3,500 other refugees had been promised visas from immigration countries, subject to successful interviews and medical examinations. The officials expected a marked increase in the transit traffic through Hong Kong, particularly during the early months of 1954.

Visas for countries of resettlement for many refugees in China can often only be issued in Hong Kong because few of the immigration countries maintain consular representatives in Shanghai. The British authorities permit the entry of refugees to those already in possession of a visa and to those having an official promise of a visa which can

be issued in Hong Kong. Some governments have shown themselves willing to facilitate the entry of refugees into Hong Kong by undertaking to accept them if the visa for a country of immigration is not forthcoming. Eighty guarantees of this kind are at present at the disposal of the UNHCR and ICEM. In only three cases has use had to be made of such a guarantee, which points to a smooth running of the system.

Entry requirements into Hong Kong which the British Authorities have been forced to adopt because of the overcrowded conditions in the territory do not, however, create a bottleneck at present. Exit permits from China, and stricter medical qualifications demanded by certain immigration countries, are temporarily slowing down the movement: from a monthly average of 276 refugees leaving Hong Kong in 1953, figures fell to 228 in January, 161 in February and 81 in March, 1954. But the number of visas promised is still at the satisfactory level of 3,422.

One of the encouraging aspects of the operation in 1953-54 has been the settling in homes and institutions in Europe of "difficult cases" amongst the destitute refugees in China. By the end of 1953 the names of 860 ailing, elderly, sick or disabled refugees and their near relatives were on the registers of the office. These refugees, because of reasons of health or age, fall outside ordinary immigration schemes.

A direct approach made by the High Commissioner to the Governments of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Portugal and Spain resulted in a total of 305 persons being offered institutional care in Europe. A first group of 51 tubercular patients and aged left Hong Kong by air in January, two other groups left in May and transportation is at present being arranged by ICEM for the others.

In view of the precarious position of the Emergency Fund no new commitments can be made. The money available guarantees the continued aid to the nearly 1,000 destitute refugees still in Shanghai until the end of August only. In addition, UNREF has to carry the cost of maintaining refugees in transit in Hong Kong, since the Office of the High Commissioner is responsible for their care and maintenance until their departure overseas.

To continue and to extend the operation of resettlement from China, both the ICEM and UNHCR need financial support from all nations concerned with the solution of the refugee problem. ICEM needs funds for the movement of the refugees, UNREF for the care and maintenance programme for the destitute in Shanghai and in Hong Kong for the refugees in transit, and for the placement of "difficult cases."

TIBET AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

By Werner Levi (University of Minnesota, U.S.A.)

THE Indian Chinese treaty of March, 1954, eliminating India's special trading and garrisoning rights along the southern trade routes of Tibet was the final, though perhaps merely symbolic act in the integration of Tibet into China. The Chinese dream of making Tibet a part of the "motherland" has come true for the time being. Similar attempts by the Imperial, Republican, and Nationalist regimes had failed because they either did not know how to befriend the Tibetans or how to suppress their desire for independence. The Communist Chinese, having learned from the mistakes of their predecessors, are using methods which will guarantee Tibet's integration for some time to come.

From the beginning of their conquest and ever after, the Chinese Communists have been using a mixture of wooing and threatening. In preparation for their invasion of Tibet they infiltrated into Tibetan monasteries, won the collaboration of Tibetans in China, with much fanfare granted "autonomy" to Tibetan minorities, and even persuaded the Panchen Lama—living in China—to work with them in return for strengthening his position *vis-à-vis* the Dalai Lama. These collaborators became tools in the propaganda campaign of the Chinese Communists that they would come to Tibet as "liberators" from a vaguely defined "imperialist yoke" and that they would be "absolutely loving and protecting the minority nationalities." And, indeed, when the People's Liberation Army eventually moved into Tibet, it generally obeyed the strict orders to befriend and not to antagonise the Tibetan people.

On the other hand, the Chinese made every possible use of the split between the Dalai and Panchen Lamas and of factionalism in Lhasa. Above all their massing of troops along the eastern and northern borders of Tibet during 1950 was a threat sufficient to make Tibetan resistance to "liberation" appear hopeless. After a short, brave and

futile attempt in the fall of 1950 to resist the invading Communist troops, the Tibetan Government had little choice but to negotiate an agreement. In order to strengthen itself with its own people and the Chinese, the unpopular Regent was removed and the Dalai Lama made king two years before his coming of age, and he was moved to Yatung, near the Indian border, so that he could bargain in safety with the Communists. Actually, his flight from Lhasa added to the panic at the capital and hardly impressed the Chinese. For when the Tibetan mission arrived in Peking in the spring of 1952 to "negotiate" the final forms of a *modus vivendi*, they had to sign an agreement submitted to them by the Chinese Government.

On the surface, this Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet appears to leave many political and social institutions of Tibet untouched. In fact, the rights guaranteed to the Tibetans are so qualified as to make Tibet an integral part of China. For instance, religious freedom is granted, but only in accordance with the terms of the Communists' Common Programme; Tibetan officials can remain in office, if they agree with the principles and policies of the Communist party. The catch-all clause, giving Peking potential control over every sphere of life, is the condition that Tibet shall have autonomy "under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government."

By giving the Tibetans this appearance of autonomy while retaining the substance of control, the Chinese Communists make themselves more acceptable and facilitate their rule. This is especially necessary in an area like Tibet, where absence of communications and shortage of supplies make the maintenance of an occupation army very difficult. The Chinese are therefore proceeding very carefully in solidifying their domination, and this process is noticeable as a trend rather than a spectacular recasting

of the country's institutional life. It moves along two main lines: the strengthening of the Communist collaborators at the expense of the established authorities and the strengthening of the new, imported Chinese authorities.

Because of his outstanding position the weakening of the Dalai Lama is a major task of the Communists. It is also a most difficult one, because an effective change in his position would practically amount to a fundamental change in Tibetan society. Nevertheless, the Communists are tackling it. They are trying to undermine the Dalai Lama's divine aura by asking him to move among his people, to participate personally in governmental councils and the innumerable propaganda meetings organised by the Communists, and to fly the Chinese flag above his palace, the Potala. The last request was refused outright, while the others are often circumvented by the sending of personal representatives or merely messages. Simultaneously, the position of the Panchen Lama is being enhanced. Some of the recent progress in Tibet is credited to him, he receives a great deal of publicity, he appears frequently at public functions, all with the view to raising his status in the eyes of the people to equal that of the Dalai Lama. Both Lamas are obliged constantly to exhibit a behaviour indicative not only of their great friendship with the Peking Government but to some extent of their subordination.

This attack upon the Dalai Lama is supplemented by the weakening of the ecclesiastical class which supplies the most powerful Government officials. They are a close-knit group, difficult to manipulate from the outside, possessing high prestige and a highly developed *esprit de corps*. It is therefore a necessity for the Chinese Communists to reduce the influence of this group, and they are trying to do it by replacing it with secular officials more accessible to Communist influence.

In addition to thus shifting the power centre away from the Dalai Lama and the ecclesiastics to individuals and groups more easily controllable, the Communists are reducing the authority of the traditional rulers by reorganising the administration of the country in such a manner that power is being decentralised away from Lhasa. The country is divided into three zones, the western headed by the Panchen Lama at Gartok, the eastern headed by Kalon Ngaboo, a former Cabinet Minister, at Chamdo, and the

central, headed by the Dalai Lama at Lhasa, who remains also chief of the Local Government of Tibet. Since the Panchen Lama and Kalon Ngaboo have shown great willingness to work with the Communists, the Dalai Lama's influence in their zones is restricted. To limit it further, even in his own zone, the Chinese have transferred many administrative offices and activities to Chamdo and have created an Administrative Council there which deals directly with Peking, avoiding Lhasa.

Until these measures will be fully successful, Peking is relying primarily upon Chinese officials for control over Tibet—the civilian representative Chang Ching-wu, the political commissar Tan Kuan-san—and above all the People's Liberation Army, whose Commander-in-Chief, Chang Kuo-hang, is today the most powerful figure in Tibet.

Detachments of the PLA are stationed all over Tibet and along the Indian border. The functions of the PLA go far beyond the usual control and police tasks of an army. The PLA is the main instrument for the development and modernisation of Tibet, it is a labour force as well as a military force. It is engaged in road building, construction of housing and schools, agriculture and irrigation, development of medical and veterinary services, propaganda activity, newspaper publishing, and innumerable other activities. At present, its major effort is devoted to the construction of three major highways into Tibet and the production of enough food to make it self-sufficient. While there can be little doubt that the activities of the PLA are aiming at better military control of Tibet and its economic exploitation for China's benefit, they are, incidentally, benefiting the Tibetans as well. Business and trading activity have increased since the arrival of the Chinese armies, education has become more widespread, some medical services are available, and modern methods are replacing some of the old habits of the Tibetan people. However, contrary to the claims of the Chinese that deep love and friendship reigns between the PLA and the local population, there is evidence that there is friction, that there have been riots, mostly due to food shortages or the requests for "voluntary" contributions of mules, yaks, and other goods to the PLA, and that the Dalai Lama and a section of the ecclesiastical class are resisting within their severe limitations the Communists' attempts to make themselves the masters of Tibet.

JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS SINCE 1952 (II)

By Hugh H. Smythe (Brooklyn, U.S.A.)

Although the Japanese controversy over rearmament holds a significant place in policy planning, it does not obscure one of the most important factors facing Japan and involving the United States: Japan's relations with other Asian nations. This has presented both America and Japan

with a most perplexing situation, since each approaches the relationship of Japan with the various nations from dissimilar points of view. As regards Korea, Japan has never looked upon her as having been an independent, democratic country; yet relations between them must be

close, for both economic and strategic reasons, and Japan feels that her occupation was mutually beneficial. On the other hand, America challenges this position on the grounds that such occupation could never be justified on any grounds. Despite this basic difference in interpretation the interests of America and Japan with regard to Korea have generally coincided since the end of World War II. They, of course, became closely intertwined during the Korean conflict. Strategically neither wanted to see a Communist Korea, Japanese industry supplied United Nations forces war material, and both countries assume that economic necessity will in the long run require Japanese-Korean cooperation.

Japan, however, wonders whether the United States is fully cognizant of the emotionally-charged relations between Japan and Korea, the latter's feelings vividly represented in the strong antipathy shown by Korean President Syngman Rhee, while the Japanese, too, are emotionally involved with feelings of technical, cultural, and political superiority. Against this background the two countries have been unable to adjust their differences and Japan has on occasion tried to use American influence since her independence over such matters as Korea's embargo on trade with Japan for goods purchased with American aid funds for Korean reconstruction, and over fishing rights in the Sea of Japan. Japan even went so far in November, 1953, as to invoke the United States-Japan security pact in a move to force South Koreans from Ting Takeshima Island in the Sea of Japan. The United States has tried to avoid taking sides in these matters, insisting merely that the two try to work out an amicable settlement.

The issue of Japan's relations with South-East Asia is made more pregnant for America and Japan by the cessation of Korean hostilities and the growing belief, especially in Japan, that the resumption of fighting in Korea is unlikely. Thus Japan, whose economy was strengthened by supplying war materials from her factories as a result of that war, must look elsewhere for markets. This is especially important since Japan is aware of the reluctance of western nations to buy large quantities of her goods, so she must look to Asia as a source of income to keep her economy going. Red China looms large on the horizon. On Japan's relationship with Communist China both Japan and America agree that it is desirable to have a reorientation of mainland China away from Russia, but they differ on methods to affect this. The Japanese feel that internal pressures inside China will have the most effect in this regard, while America leans towards external factors, such as a blockade of the Chinese Coast. There is a difference also as regards the Formosa government of Chiang Kai-shek. The Japanese feel that the Kuomintang Government is now useless in view of the great changes that have taken place on the mainland and they believe that Chiang no longer can provide the prestige necessary to cement the country in any attempt to unseat the Communists. Strong pro-Chiang elements in the present American administration, however, do not look favourably on this point of view.

A major difference concerns the matter of trade.

Japan looks upon trade with Red China as a sort of life-and-death matter, made even more urgent since the close of hostilities in Korea. Formerly, Japan obtained substantial amounts of industrial raw material from Chinese territories and relied heavily on China as an export market. Markets and sources of raw materials she must have if her economy is to remain viable, and she must offset the loss of markets elsewhere in Asia and meet the competition of Great Britain, who has steadily worked to keep Japanese goods away from South-East Asia.

Although America has frowned upon any trade with China, Japanese business men have demanded the right to wider trade with the mainland; and the Diet's House of Representatives in July, 1953, approved unanimously a resolution calling for more trade with Communist China and an easing of government restrictions on such trade. This move embarrassed American officials who are conscious of political sentiments on the part of the Eisenhower Administration leaders towards trade with Red China, yet who realise clearly that Japan must be allowed to improve her trade relations with other nations or suffer severe economic repercussions. Japan, however, has gone ahead with trade relations with China and in a single month, November, 1953, increased her trade to nine times the average for the previous five months, exporting \$1,596,000 worth of goods to Communist China and importing \$1,332,400 worth.

Aside from the rearmament factor, there is some appreciation in Japan for the position of America concerning its desire to stop the expansion of Communism in Indo-China. The Dulles proposal of "massive retaliation" was looked upon with favour, as it was considered an indirect promise that Japan, if attacked, would be given "emergency rescue" by America. This is construed to mean that it would not be necessary for American garrison forces to remain in Japan for more than perhaps a couple of years longer, even if Japan itself built up only a small defence force.

Japanese-American relations are in what might be called unbalanced harmony over former Japanese possessions. There is mutual desire for a return of the Ryuku and the Russian-held Kurile Islands to Japanese sovereignty, as well as the Bonins. The return by the United States last December of the Amami Oshima Islands north of Okinawa was a smoothing factor in relations on this matter. The two countries also understand the necessity for the United States to retain certain bases in former Japanese possessions to counter-balance the Russians in the Kuriles. Although the issue of the return of former possessions has been used by some opposition forces in Japan to stir up anti-American feeling, as yet the issue of the return of islands has not become a major one between the two countries.

Although Japan expressed an interest in attending the Korean Peace Conference, this has not been a cause for concern between the United States and Japan. In August, 1953, in Tokyo, Mr. Yoshida stated that he was certainly not going to press America for Japanese representation in the conference.

(To be continued)

ASIA FOR THE ASIANS AND JAPAN

By our Tokyo Correspondent

UNDER the headline "Asia for Asians" there have recently been some new developments in the field of inter-Asian relations on which much of Japan's future is hinged. When Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea, visited Chiang Kai-shek in Taipeh last November, they both called for the formation of a Pacific anti-Communist pact. However, the two leaders remained alone in the field. A blunt refusal to join the pact came first from Magsaysay, President of the Philippines, while other countries of the region, such as Indonesia, Burma and Thailand showed little or no interest to join the Formosa-Korea team. The continued poor relations between South Korea and Japan are, of course, another hindrance for the envisaged pact. South Korea consistently refuses to normalise conditions with Japan and has even vigorously refused to use Japanese supplies for reconstruction purposes. Taipeh, however, considers the industrial and military potential of Japan as an indispensable link of an Asian anti-Communist league, while Rhee's hatred of the Japanese precluded such a formation as long as Japan is not prepared to give ground to the demands of South Korea.

In the Philippines, the slogan "Asia for Asians" has led to an argument between Romulo, Philippine representative in the United States, and Guerrero, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. During a lecture tour in the United States, Romulo warned the American public against this slogan which was Japan's watchword before and during the Pacific war and was now being "picked up" by Nehru. It seems that Romulo considered that slogan as signifying a kind of nationalism which might not meet with the approval of the United States. Guerrero, on his part, explained that though "Asia for Asians" was used as a propaganda slogan by Japan, the idea itself is not a Japanese invention, but expresses the legitimate aspirations

of the Asian nations. Guerrero went on to say: "To explain 'Asia for Asians' as a Japanese slogan is to misunderstand any genuine nationalism, whether Asian or American. To warn the United States against revolutionary Asians, is not only to offend Asia, but also to mislead the United States." The argument between Romulo and Guerrero has been watched with considerable interest in Japan, though much of its importance has been discounted as Philippine domestic politics. Nevertheless, all discussions, movements, organisations and institutions pertaining to comprehensive Asian regional affairs are closely followed in Japan. Japanese participation in such bodies as ECAFE, or the Asian Olympic Games in Manila, or the Asian Film Festival is predominant and her delegates are usually handpicked and highly qualified.

On April 1, 1954, an Asian Association was formed in Tokyo. The initiative came from the Gaimusho, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their intention was to integrate into one body more than thirty separate organisations concerned with South-East Asian regional affairs. Plans for this new body were devised by the Asian Economic Council, a semi-governmental advisory group to the Gaimusho. Among the tasks of the newly created organisation are the preparation of economic surveys, the despatch of Japanese technicians and the rendering of technical assistance in the development of South-East Asia. Branches are scheduled to be opened at some later stage. A government subsidy of 30m. Yen (about £45,000) is expected for the current fiscal year. Among the principal officers of the organisation are leading personalities in the economic life of Japan. The activities of the Asian Association will certainly attract much attention, since it is the first attempt of a concentrated nature made by Japan to overcome the obstacles in her way to the markets in Asia.

THE TWO PAKISTANS (continued from page 12)

to India, Bengalis are far more concerned about the issues on their own doorsteps—like autonomy for the province, recognition of its language, and the abolishing of the visa system between East and West Bengal.

Now all these differences would have a far better chance of being resolved if the political nation was entirely within a common geographically contiguous frontier. As it is, physical separateness militates against the single nation. Pakistan was created in such a hurry and Bengal has been treated cavalierly for so long that provincialism has put down strong roots.

There were at the time of partition only a handful of Muslims left in the government services in East Bengal—the balance had been made up of the better-educated Hindus who crossed the frontier to Calcutta. This meant that

large numbers of non-Bengali Muslims had to be brought over from West Pakistan to run the administration in Bengal. Most of them are still here. Business and commerce had long been financed by wealthy industrialists from West Pakistan since the Bengalis never had much money. And in a land where nepotism thrives, it is natural enough that they should seek to employ their own people in the best posts.

For long these factors have been creating a delicate situation in East Bengal. It is difficult for the authorities alone to resolve it; for, to quote from a leading article in the *Calcutta Statesman*, "a provincial administration which is rigid towards outsiders is open to the accusation of neglecting the national interests; one which encourages them is likely to seem unfair to provincial interests." While national interests should probably come first, it is difficult to identify with any precision those interests which

the Bengali and the Sindi and the Punjabi and the rest have in common. Common sense still points to the fact that the Pakistani East Bengali has a good deal more in common with the Indian West Bengali than with many of the groups in the other segment of his own country.

Hence the speculations. Will East Bengal move towards independence or make some attempt to unite with West Bengal? Is West Pakistan getting ready to impose military rule in Bengal (the army is about 90 per cent. non-Bengali in make-up)? Or will the present tensions be removed and the two segments of the country, united by their Islamic faith, work together harmoniously for the welfare of the long-suffering people?

At the moment, the conflict between the two areas is exacerbated by the fact that the Central Government in Karachi is controlled by the same Muslim League which was overwhelmingly defeated in East Bengal in the March elections. It would appear that several influential Muslim Leaguers in the West have taken the view that the very existence of an anti-League Government in Bengal is a threat to the existence of Pakistan; which, after all, was the line taken by Prime Minister Mohammed Ali and Miss Fatima Jinnah, sister of the founder of Pakistan, when they made pre-election tours in East Bengal. Distrust between the East and West wings of Pakistan is mutual and highly prejudicial to the creation of real national unity.

What happened at Adamjee has thrown into relief a situation which was already causing uneasiness. Every nation has its growing pains, and no new nation can hope to grow up without them. But this country can afford no more Adamjees; no more meaningless massacres based on irrational prejudices. If Pakistan is to survive in its present form, there must be less irresponsible talking on the part of its leaders, and from its people more tolerance than has yet been shown for divergent viewpoints and interests. Arrogance, jealousy and mutual antagonism do not contribute to the life of a nation; but they are perfectly capable of destroying it.

MORE MILES FOR YOUR MONEY!! KEYSTONE FULLY REBUILT TYRES

FOR
Trucks, Buses & Cars

CIF PRICES ON
REQUEST

EXPORT DEPT.:
Keystone Tyre & Rubber
Co.

18, Hill Park Rd., Fareham
Hants., England.



Cables: KEYSTONE, FAREHAM



STEEL KEY TO INDUSTRY

No. 2

This quaint antique key is believed to be at least 300 years old. It is English country made and was forged by a typical English country smith, who was in those days Jack of all trades and master of many and the background of the tradition of the great English Steel Industry.

Steel in its many specialised forms is in constant and growing use in trades as diverse as food-canning and shipbuilding. It is the common factor in the manufacture of a thousand otherwise dissimilar consumer and industrial goods. Hallamshire steels are in the great British tradition of steelmaking. Are you making use of them?

Hallamsteel

Manufacturers of
ALLOY & SPECIAL CARBON STEELS
BARS · SHEETS · PLATES · WIRE RODS
THE HALLAMSHIRE STEEL & FILE
CO. LTD., SHEFFIELD 3, ENGLAND
Telephone: Sheffield 24304 (7 lines)
Telegrams: Hallamsteel, Sheffield.

JAMES MACKIE & SONS LIMITED



Textile Machinery Manufacturers
ALBERT FOUNDRY · BELFAST

Specialists in the manufacture of
machinery for the processing of
Manila, Sisal, Flax, Hemp, Jute and
similar Bast and Leaf Fibres into
Rope, Twine, Yarn, Sacks and Fabrics
of all kinds

FROM ALL QUARTERS

Sixth Great Buddhist Council

The Sixth Great Buddhist Council to be held since the death of Buddha opened in the "Great Cave" near Rangoon in May. Some 2,500 monks are taking part in



the Council, which will last for two years. The opening ceremonies in the Great Cave—a replica of the cave at Rajagaha, India, where the first Council was held—lasted three days. The purpose of the Great Councils is the preservation and purification of the teachings of Buddha. About 5,000 people were in the Cave for the opening addresses. The oldest monk present, Ma Ngay Sayadaw, aged 91, was a novice when the last Council was called by King Mindon of Burma in 1871.

Pictures show :

(Top) The Venerable Abhidaja Mararathagura Bhaddanta Revata, 80, who has assumed the leadership of the Sixth World Buddhist Council as Sanghanayaka, or President, seated on his golden throne in the Great Hall of the Great Cave.

(Centre) The British Ambassador to Burma, Mr. P. H. Gore-Booth, reads a message of goodwill from the British Government.

(Below) A semi-general view of the scene in the Great Hall during the opening ceremonies. The lay congregation is seated on the floor in the centre. The monks taking part in the council are seated in the galleries.

First Ceylonese Governor-General


Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., K.B.E., will succeed Lord Soulbury as Governor-General of Ceylon, when the latter's conventional term comes to an end this month. Sir Oliver will be the first Ceylonese to hold this office.

Sir Oliver, who is 61, has had a varied career. He first entered government service in 1921 as an Assistant Auditor, becoming Colonial Auditor in 1924 and Auditor-General in 1931. When war broke out he was placed in charge of the Island's civil defence. From 1945-47 he served as Financial Secretary, and was Minister of Home Affairs and Rural Development from '47 to '48, when he was appointed as Ceylon's first High Commissioner in the U.K. He returned to Ceylon in 1951 and assumed duties as Leader of the Senate and Minister of Home Affairs. Last year, after the Cabinet reshuffle following the August disturbances, he became Finance Minister.

A skilled diplomat, an astute politician and a financial wizard, Sir Oliver has been the chief adviser to Ceylon Prime Ministers past and present.

Museums in Italy and Japan exchange Exhibits

The Municipal Art Museum in Osaka, Japan, and the Antiquities and Fine Arts Section of Italy's Ministry of Education have agreed to exchange examples of ancient art. Japan is sending to Italy a collection of prehistoric treasures which includes ceramics, weapons, tools, personal ornaments, and a number of objects made of crystal, bronze and iron dating back to 600 years B.C., in the Jomon, Yayoi and Kofun dynasties. Italy is offering a collection of Etruscan and Roman objects from the Antiquarium of the Palatinate. Further exchanges are being discussed between the two countries.



Fly by B.O.A.C.
to all six continents

GREAT BRITAIN • USA • SWITZERLAND • GERMANY • ITALY • BERMUDA
BAHAMAS • CANADA • WEST INDIES • SOUTH AMERICA
MIDDLE EAST • WEST AFRICA • EAST AFRICA
SOUTH AFRICA • PAKISTAN • INDIA • CEYLON
AUSTRALIA • NEW ZEALAND • FAR EAST • JAPAN

Consult your local Travel Agent or any B.O.A.C. office.

FLY BY B.O.A.C

BRITISH OVERSEAS AIRWAYS CORPORATION IN ASSOCIATION WITH QANTAS EMPIRE
AIRWAYS LIMITED, SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS AND TASMAN EMPIRE AIRWAYS LIMITED

Meter Engineering

By J. L. FERNS, B.Sc. (Hons.), M.I.E.E. Up-to-date Sixth Edition. 27/- net.

"This excellently illustrated and comprehensive work is one that no meter testing assistant can afford to be without, while the lucid treatment of underlying theory makes it a useful textbook."—*MECHANICAL WORLD*.

Microscopical Techniques in Metallurgy

By HENRY THOMPSON, A.I.Prod.E., A.F.Sc.S., A.M.I.E.I.

A new book which forms a valuable reference work for students, inspectors, and examiners in the metal industries, providing them with information about the recommended techniques used in the microscopical examinations of metals. Illustrated. 18/- net.

Pneumoconiosis Abstracts

Volume II. 1939-1950.

Reprinted from *The Bulletin of Hygiene*. This second volume, together with Volume I, contains all the abstracts of papers relating to pneumoconiosis which have been published in *The Bulletin of Hygiene* from the time of its first appearance in 1926 to the end of 1950. Volume II covers the period 1939 to 1950. It is fully indexed and provides valuable material for the student and specialist. 518 pages. 80/- net.

pitman

Parker Street,
Kingsway,
London, W.C.2

The Design of Dams

By A. BOURGIN. Translated by F. F. Fergusson. Illustrated. 45/- net.

"... The book is a distinct acquisition to all those concerned with the design of dams... a real contribution to the literature on dams... The book is one which every engineer engaged on dam design would find of great value for reference."

THE STRUCTURAL ENGINEER.

An Italian View on International Affairs

RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI

24 Pages—150 Lire

A weekly magazine published by:

**ISTITUTO PER GLI STUDI DI
POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE**

Via Clerici 5-Milano

Subscription for a year (52 issues, supplements and index)—Lire 6.000 or \$9.6

A single issue—Lire 150 or \$0.25

RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI

gives you full documentation on International and Italian foreign affairs

BOOKS on the

India and the Awakening East by ELEANOR ROOSEVELT (Hutchinson, 15s.).

It is not clear whether Mrs. Roosevelt's tour in early 1952 of the Indian subcontinent, of which most of this book is an account, was made in her capacity as a United Nations official or as a private person. It was, however, sponsored by the governments of the countries she visited and seems to be addressed to her fellow-countrymen as a contribution to American-Asian friendship.

The result is curious and reads like an expanded "My Day" interspersed with accounts of social and industrial projects and a potted and streamlined history of India seemingly calculated to appeal to a readership of American clubwomen with no knowledge of the East whatever.

At this level the book is useful enough. As an official guest Mrs. Roosevelt's criticisms are confined to such matters as Miss Jinnah's refusal to meet her (which was hardly surprising) and the Indian Government's over-excessive caution for her safety in the air. Here and there a scene of personal involvement shines out from the earnest and dull routine tour schedule. As when, in Pakistan, she was induced to listen to an address of welcome, and to answer it, perched precariously on a high platform suspended between two camels; or on the occasion when she firmly but successfully dealt with a students' demonstration at Allahabad University.

Though Mrs. Roosevelt makes a spirited attempt to analyse the reasons for Communist successes in Asia, it is discouraging to find her using the now well-worn clichés about Communism. She points out that the Government of Indonesia "has recognised the Republic of China, so there is an active Communist centre in the Chinese embassy there. It is very easy for Chinese Communists to infiltrate into Indonesia and it would be foolish to think they are not doing so. *Therefore we would be unwise not to co-operate to the best of our ability in the development of Indonesia in order to make life more worth while for the people.*" (My italics).

It is a sad comment on the extent to which the generous instincts that are a natural and a national characteristic in American life have become increasingly tied to the anti-Communist bandwagon, that this rationalisation should have been written by a well-known and otherwise admirable American liberal.

IAN LE MAISTRE

Bhowani Junction by JOHN MASTERS (Michael Joseph, 12s. 6d.)

The City and the Wave by JON GODDEN (Michael Joseph, 10s. 6d.)

After writing some very readable novels about a bygone India, John Masters has tried to produce a novel of the India of our own time, and here he is in the very vulnerable position of dealing with people and times that readers may know as well as he does—and even better. He has a good subject—the life and love story of an Anglo-

FAR EAST

Indian station master's daughter who holds a commission in the Women's Auxiliary Corps—during the hectic days of the pre-partition disturbances. We have the name of Rodney Savage here once more, the inheritor of the tradition of the empire builders of the days of Mutiny and thuggery, having his final fling with power and with Anglo-Indian womanhood in the twilight of Empire. But Mr. Masters shows a strange lack of insight into the people he describes and, despite his dedicatory lines, of sympathy with the community of half-whites who are a by-product of British rule and whose moral standards are exactly the same as those of the British, though more exposed to public view in the small isolated groups in which they live and move. As a result he cooks his characters to an old recipe and one comes across such highly laughable conversational titbits as the condescending remark of Rodney Savage to the Indian collector and district magistrate: "You are a dashed good fellow for a native. Allow me the privilege of putting you up for my club next time you are in Town." This in 1946, in which year incidentally Bhowani had in office the first Indian collector it had known!

I really enjoyed Miss Godden's story. Len Chase is a completely authentic lonely Anglo-Indian who is running to seed in a small clerical job in a commercial firm and finds a certain amount of cultural stimulus as well as enjoyment in friendships with a priest at a Catholic college and with an astrologer neighbour. One comes across just such types in Indian cities and, if there is an element of improbability in the manner in which romance enters into the hero's life, the whole picture is well drawn. The great event that the astrologer has anticipated for the people of Calcutta becomes an obsession with Chase, whose mind has been long troubled by the spectacle of so many people around and so much misery and poverty. At the time named for the tidal wave that Chase expects to overwhelm the city something important does happen for him but life in Calcutta goes on.

BERNARD FONSECA

Report on Indo-China by BERNARD NEWMAN (*Robert Hale, 18s.*)

Events in Indo-China have moved so fast that this volume is already rather out of date on many points. Nevertheless it is worth reading if only as a good piece of descriptive writing by a very experienced writer in many fields. Mr. Newman went to Indo-China just a year ago and, moving around with considerable speed and enterprise, contrived to meet a large number of people in all walks of life from the Emperor Bao Dai and his ministers to peasants and workers, including a large number of the primitive Mois. He has recorded his impressions in a most interesting manner and with every effort at accuracy, but he has completely missed the other side of the picture, the forces that are making for change in the country. He seems convinced of the good intentions of France and of the

Who invented ballpoint writing?



Biro were the originators of the ballpoint principle—so it's no wonder they make the best ballpoints in the world! Look at all these advantages—every handsome new Biro has them!



Try this simple test. Write your name with a Biro: now run your finger over the signature. You'll find it *cannot* smudge—thanks to new smudge-proof Biro Blue-66, the perfect ink.



No risk here! Thanks to new Blue-66 ink and precision manufacture, no Biro will ever leak and stain your clothes, no matter what the temperature. And the Biro point is made to within *one ten-thousandth* of an inch—that's another reason why it's the best ballpoint in the world.

Biro

they're right on the ball

feasibility of beating the Viet Minh. He sees no good coming out of talks with the Viet Minh and refuses to entertain the thought of a partition of the country—which is just what is on the cards today. He finds many reports from Indo-China which appear in French and British newspapers so pessimistic as to cause alarm and despondency. It is easy for a reviewer to be wise after the event, but it is hard to see how a reporter of Mr. Newman's experience overlooked the distortion of news from that country which was achieved by the Viet Nam and French censorship to minimise the seriousness of the situation—the plight of France at the present moment shows which side was burying its head in the sand.

The volume is most attractively illustrated with numerous photographs.

ARGUS

Student Counselling in Japan by WESLEY P. LLOYD
(Minnesota University Press. London; Geoffrey Cumberlege, 32s.)

One of the unusual outcomes of the occupation of Japan by American forces has been the impact of American ideas on a country with an old culture of its own. Finding Japanese education bookish in the extreme, the Ministry of Education and the Civil Information and Education of SCAP decided to draw on the experience of a new country and accordingly after the usual preliminary preparations, a team of American experts on student personnel services headed by Dr. Lloyd, who is the dean of students at

Pakistan Horizon

Published quarterly by the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi.

Contains papers on international questions, particularly those in which Pakistan is interested.

Annual subscription - - Rs. 8-0-0 (or 20/-)
Single copy - - - - - Rs. 2-0-0 (or 5/-)

Brigham Young University, Utah, organised three courses at Tokyo, Kyushu and Kyoto. Here, Japanese and American educationists exchanged ideas on many aspects of student welfare, and in the exchanges it is admitted by Dr. Lloyd that not all the learning was on one side. The Americans found that, as General Ridgway had predicted, the Japanese had much to offer from their own remarkable cultural pattern that was challenging to American educators. The field covered included personnel records, tests and measurements, student activities, vocational guidance, financial help, housing of students and a variety of other subjects the study of which was felt to be necessary in breaking down the formalism of Japanese education and enriching it in many ways.

D.S.P.

Ananda Bazar Patrika ★ Desh ★ Hindusthan Standard

Read the News of India & Pakistan

Reach the Public in India & Pakistan

Subscription Rates
By Air via London

ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA

In Bengali from Calcutta

£3/12/0—3 months
£1/2/6—3 months

Daily
Bi-Weekly

£1/4/0 p.s.c.i.
4/6 p.s.c.i.

13/6—3 months

DESH

Bengali Weekly from Calcutta

7/6 p.s.c.i.

£3/12/0—3 months

HINDUSTHAN STANDARD

18/9 p.s.c.i.

English Daily Simultaneously from Calcutta & New Delhi

See-mail Subscription Rates and fuller information for Advertising on application

Telephone: CENTRAL 1821

LONDON OFFICE

Cables: HINDSTAND, LONDON

Salisbury Square House, Salisbury Square, Fleet Street, London, E.C.4

London Representative: Dr. TARAPADA BASU

Head Office: CALCUTTA, INDIA. Other Offices in India: JAMSHEDPUR, NEW DELHI, PATNA, BOMBAY, SHILLONG, MADRAS, GAUHATI, etc.
Agencies abroad: in many other centres of Asia and of Africa, Europe and America

Wisdom of the East

Over 100 volumes now bear witness to the inspired vision and zeal of the late Mr. Cranmer-Byng and Dr. Kapadia who edited and launched upon the world the first volumes of a series destined to open to western readers the sealed doors of Asiatic literature. Continued by a younger Cranmer-Byng, the Series, still published by John Murray, goes from strength to strength; finely produced, attractively bound and eminently portable, the little books have proved good companions to people in all parts of the world. Three recent volumes have a special claim to attention:

Tao Tê Ching (7s.) is a new critical translation of the famous philosophical work attributed to Lao Tzu, by Professor J. J. L. Duyvendak of Leiden University. Examining the work of some of his predecessors the translator declares the need for a rearrangement of the text in order to restore the work to something like its original form. He is scrupulously fair: every step he takes is declared, reasons are given for such changes as he makes, and, above all, he is far from asserting that all difficulties are now resolved. In fact his uncertainty on some doubtful points is stated boldly. This is no doubt the best introduction to early Taoist thought for the general reader; to the Chinese scholar it offers much useful material for thought.

The Dhammapada (5s.) is a new version by the Venerable Narada Thera for English readers of the Pali text. Many Buddhists have declared that the work is for them a complete guide; that it holds the very germ of the Buddha's teaching. It is, indeed, much more readable than many of the deeply philosophical works of Buddhism; none the less, its meaning does not always lie on the surface, and there is room for this new annotated translation. The learned author has supplied abundant footnotes to help the general reader.

Literatures of the East (8s. 6d.) is a collection of summary accounts of the literatures of the leading Near and Far East countries, by faculty members of Cambridge University. Highly compressed as these studies are, they are stimulating, provocative, and adequate. The general reader will finish the book feeling that at least he has a sound basis for further reading; the student could not have a better primer, and even the scholar will be the better for recalling half-forgotten studies in scanning the excellent bibliographies which round off each section of the work.

N.W.

China Trader by A. H. RASMUSSEN (*Constable*, 18s.)

This is the story of a young merchant seaman who "swallowed the anchor" at the early age of 20, joined the Chinese Customs as a tide waiter and then successfully entered the service of a well-known British firm. Back in his native Norway he tells a lively tale from which many an old China hand will derive nostalgic pleasure. Mr. Rasmussen unconsciously reveals those admirable qualities which win confidence and affection for a stranger in a strange land. He liked the people among whom his lot was cast. He lets his story tell itself; its tolerant vein

COLLET'S BOOKSHOPS announce

LU HSUN

SELECTED STORIES

The first collection of stories by this great Chinese writer to be published in the English language. Handsomely bound.

Price 3s. 6d. (post 9d. extra) from
COLLET'S BOOKSHOPS
44 & 45 Museum St., London, W.C1



does not preclude championship of the underdog nor playful understanding of the idiosyncrasies of rascality whenever it be met. Sophisticated searchers after political truth may be disappointed at his omission to provide them with material.

EDWIN HAWARD

Deux Sophistes Chinois : Hwei Che et Kong-souen Long by IGNACE KOU PAO-KOH (*Bibliothèque de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, Vol. 8. Presses Universitaires de France*, 36s.)

In 1901 Professor Forke presented a paper to the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, entitled *The Chinese Sophists*. This was the first attempt at an English translation of the chief works of the Chinese dialecticians, and until last year it was unchallenged. Then Max Perleberg published in Hong Kong a detailed examination of the six chapters of Kung-sun Lung-tzu; he attempted a translation of both text and commentary, but it must be admitted that the result fell short of Professor Forke's earlier achievement. In the present work, Dr. Ku has furnished a Chinese text, a careful translation, introductory and summarising chapters, as well as many illuminating footnotes. He has availed himself of all the critical material of the new school of Chinese literary criticism, and philological and etymological researches of Ch'ing dynasty scholars. He has put in parallel the ideas of the Greek sophists and the result is a work which will remain standard for many years, if indeed it can ever be superseded.

NEVILLE WHYMANT

TECHNICAL INSTITUTES

Teachers in Jewellery & Engineering Schools:

We have been supplying your technical requirements for over 100 years. Write for our catalogue.

E. GRAY & SON, Ltd.

12 & 14, Clerkenwell Road, London, E.C.1.

Telegraphic Address: "Materials, Smith, London"

Pour comprendre ce qui se passe dans le Monde, lisez chaque semaine

LA TRIBUNE DES NATIONS

le grand hebdomadaire de politique internationale

Ses reportages, ses interviews, ses enquêtes, sa page économique et . . .

tout ce qu'on n'ose écrire nulle part ailleurs sur les dessous de la politique internationale

Demandez numeros specimens gratuits :
150, Av. des Champs-Élysées, PARIS (8ème)

SELL TO FRANCE AND BUY IN FRANCE

All Roads of the Trade between
All Asiatic Countries and France
lead through

L'ASIE NOUVELLE (THE MODERN ASIA)

The Only French Monthly Review
Devoted to Economic Problems of
ALL COUNTRIES OF ASIA

Subscribe and advertise
Yearly subscription: £3/-

Subscriptions and information :

EASTERN WORLD, 45 Dorset St., London, W.1.

L'ASIE NOUVELLE is published at :
97, rue St. Lazare, Paris 9e (France)

Indian Temples by ODETTE MONOD-BRUHL (*Oxford University Press*, Rs.15)

First published in 1937, this collection of 150 photographs of Indian temples and mosques has now been re-issued. Together with the accompanying notes by Madame Odette Monod-Bruhl, of the Musée Guimet, they form a good introduction to the architecture of India, although a more complete picture could have been achieved by the addition of illustrations of finds in Harappa and Mohenjodaro, showing discoveries which have been made since this book was first published. It is a pity, too, that although the photographs have been carefully chosen, the reproduction of them is disappointing.

S. N. GUPTA

The Holy Lake of the Acts of Rama (*Tulasi Das's Ramacaritamanasa*). Translated by W. D. P. Hill (*Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press*, 25s)

This is the second English translation of a famous Hindi poem written over 400 years ago around the life of the epic hero Rama. It adopts a spiritual rather than a heroic attitude in its exposition of Rama's message of salvation, and for example omits such incidents as the banishing of Sita by Rama. It is pure gospel and extremely popular with Hindus of all classes, though some of the long meditative passages may tire the Western reader. Its popularity is shown in the annual performance of the religious play, the Ram Lila, in almost every town and village of North India. The appearance of a new translation into English by Mr. Hill, whose English translation of the Gita is well known, will be welcomed by all persons interested in Hindu religious literature.

B. E. F.

The Resignation by JAINENDRA KUMAR. Translated by S. H. VATSAYAN (*Delhi: Siddharta Publications*, Rs.2)

There are distinct possibilities in the story of a good class Indian woman who is driven by an unhappy marriage into a life of immorality as told by a devoted nephew nearly her own age. But it is rather painful to read a narrative in which the author is so "social problem conscious" that he has to treat us to a harangue rather than an attempt at dramatic presentation of a human tale. One cannot help feeling that the translator could have done better.

D. S. P.

The Manufacturers' Manual for 1954 (*Littlebury & Co., Worcester*, 30s.)

The Official Register of the National Union of Manufacturers with a full list of members of the union and other reference information for the businessman in Britain and overseas in over 1,000 pages. Sections are devoted to overseas representatives in Britain, to British commercial representatives abroad and to information as to chambers of commerce, banks, etc., in all parts of the world.

REVIEW OF REVIEWS

ONE of the clearest and most interesting surveys of life in post-war Japan is contained in the Unesco journal *The Courier* (No. 4-5, 1954). The survey is based on the report (to be published this month) of a Unesco enquiry team. The series of five articles, or stories, are presented in a most readable form, and well illustrated. The type of writing seems to attain that happy state of combining the best of both American and British journalism. The emphasis in the articles is on youth, and perhaps the most interesting is the one devoted to the changing attitude of present day young people to the tradition of the Japanese family, hierarchy and filial piety. It throws them often into agonising dilemmas, torn between their desire for emancipation and their inculcated sense of duty and attachment to the code of *giri*. The survey is most informative and presents on the whole an optimistic view.

It cannot be said that Sir Alvary Gascoigne is very optimistic about the future of Asia as far as the influence of Communism is concerned. In a comprehensive round up of "Russia's Relations with Asia," a talk reprinted in the April issue of the Royal Central Asian Society's journal, he thinks that the pressure the Communists are putting on individual Asian countries is a danger signal. He says, for

instance, that Russia and China might combine in a drive to the south and east, towards India and Japan, to spread the cause of Communism. No one who holds such views ever adequately explains why Communist countries should wish to overtax their regimes internally by proselytising by the sword. Lenin's words on the eventual communisation of the world are often quoted, but Lenin surely meant the spread of international Communism not the actual export of Russian Bolshevism. Sir Alvary thinks that Mr. Nehru's neutralism is too neutral and that he "will have to take a more definite line." He calls Pakistan more politically solid than India, which is another way of saying she is stable enough to side with the West and receive American military aid. Recent events seem to disprove this.

A passionate defence of Pakistan's acceptance of military aid is contained in an article by Mohammed Ahsen Chaudri in *Pakistan Horizon* Volume VI, No. 4 (Karachi). When Pakistanis defend the issue of military aid they always give the impression that in their hearts they do not really agree with the cause they are espousing. This article does that. The lengths to which the author goes to prove that India is a big bad wolf are scarcely convincing, and the tone is sometimes petulant. The article, in the light of the troubles in East Bengal and the general tenuous situation in Asia as a whole, is as convincing an argument against Pakistan's taking US military aid as it is for her acceptance of it.

Letters to the Editor

INDUSTRIALISATION or AGRICULTURE ?

SIR.—In the April, 1954, issue of *EASTERN WORLD* (p. 43), Dr. F. C. Benham, representative of Malaya and British Borneo, was reported as having stated at the ECAFE Conference in Ceylon, that "while a few years ago most people were in favour of a rapid and all-out industrialisation as the remedy in the ECAFE area, a great change of attitude towards the question had taken place lately. Governments have revised their plans several times and every revision was in the direction of giving more weight to investment in agriculture and less weight to industrialisation." Allegedly, also, Dr. Benham referred to a changed attitude in other economists, and gave Professor A. W. Lewis as an instance.

If the statement was reported correctly, it is advisable to examine it a little more fully.

Dr. F. C. Benham is not an independent economist but the Economic Adviser to the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia. His views may or may not be his own, but he speaks as a civil servant, i.e., he expresses the policy of the United Kingdom Government. There are many people in South-East Asia, both Asian and European, who disagree heartily with Dr. Benham's thesis and who doubt the correctness of his information as to change of views by Asian governments. On this last point he was criticised by Mr. K. B. Lall, the Indian delegate at the same conference.

Dr. Benham's example of England and the industrial revolution is hackneyed, and should no longer be quoted in informed Asian circles. The Asians, too, the Doctor should know by now, have read their own history, and learned that of colonial England in practice!

What has the effect been of the previous emphasis on primary development? Malaya, for instance, has suffered enough by the fact of having her economy precariously balanced on two primary products, rubber and tin. The

same dangerous position has been observed in Indonesia, Burma, Indo-China and, one may add, India; all countries where only agriculture or one or two primary products were pushed forward by former metropolitan powers, at the cost of retarded local secondary industrial development. The economic lopsidedness of the Asian areas today is the after-effect of many causes, all related to this peculiar type of industrial development.

I have followed Professor Lewis's writings quite closely. I cannot find any change of mind, nor a retreat from previously held views but, probably, a deeper assessment of the existing problem.

Certain semi-official groups and even small academic circles support Dr. Benham's alleged thesis, but not because it is felt that it would be best for the countries concerned. The explanation of this retreat from previously held views must be sought in the present industrial position of former metropolitan countries, in their wish to keep up their existing, home, standard of living and, thus, finding it necessary to export manufactures and import cheap raw materials. Asia has always been their best customer and cheap raw material producer. The explanation must also be sought in the anti-industrialisation feelings held by certain European and Asian mercantile groups, for instance, in entrepot-trade Singapore and in Colombo, and in the attitude towards secondary industrialisation by the primary industrial groups using very large slices of Chinese and Indian labour, for instance, rubber and tea, coal and tin, and petrol.

Would industrialisation narrow the present pool of available labour? If so, would the groups just mentioned view with relish the industrial development of India and South-East Asia? In most of the primary industries just mentioned it is stated that the labour cost forms the highest proportion of all-in costs (e.g., 65 per cent. in the rubber industry in Malaya). Obviously, a limited labour pool within an expanding economy would encourage competition for labour and, thus, bring about a rise in

the rates of wages paid. All-in costs would increase and profits fall.

It is a strange fact that the Americans, who are made the scapegoat for many things in Asia, are the only ones who have consistently believed, and still believe, that the industrialisation of Asia is to be considered not only as an economic, but mainly as a socio-political development of

first importance aiding the battle of democracy versus Communism. Are we not fighting the same battle?

These and similar questions must be asked to find out whether or not Dr. Benham's official thesis means what it says.

Yours, etc.,

ANAK MELAYU.

Singapore.

SOME MEDIAEVAL TRAVELLERS TO THE EAST

By James Ledwith

MOST people may think that Marco Polo was the only traveller who penetrated to the Far East in Mediaeval times. He lived about 1254-1324, and his experiences at the court of Kublai Khan are embodied in his *Travels*. It would not, however, be correct to regard Marco Polo as the only tenuous link between Europe and Cathay. The Church had her missions in eastern China in the 14th century, and an overland trade route existed between China and Italy.

Europe in the 13th century represented the high noon of Catholic civilisation. But in that age there was the persistent menace of the East. In that age, also, lived those Emperors of Mongol blood, of the Yuen Dynasty, who are known as the Great Khans—Chinghis, Ogotay, Kuyuk, Mangu, and Kublai. The first of these died in 1227 and the last—Polo's Kublai Khan—in 1294. By that time, the barbaric vigour of the first Mongols had been enervated by luxury, and their final state of effeminacy left them quite unable to resist the resurgence of Chinese power in eastern Asia. Yet the first exploits which they wrought in Europe were such as might produce fear even in far distant France. They subdued the dominion of Turkey, overcame the Russians, and by 1241 had defeated the Polish army and crossed the Oder. Mathew Paris could write "a detestable nation of Satan, to wit, the countless army of the Tartars, broke loose from its mountain-environed home . . . Swarming like locusts over the face of the earth, they have brought terrible devastation . . . they have razed cities, cut down forests, killed townspeople and peasants . . . they are inhuman and beastly . . . without human laws . . . are more ferocious than lions or bears . . . their wives are taught to fight like men." Allowing for exaggeration, we may still imagine the fear and detestation which the Mongols inspired. It is well for Europe that Ogotay died in 1241. His death meant that the Mongolian Princes, in spite of themselves, had to return to elect a new Emperor. There was never another invasion, though the Mongol Emperors might assume such airs as to suggest that Louis IX of France and the Pope should become their subjects. Mangu Khan was the author of this idea. Had the first Mongol invasion continued, it seems that their very numbers might have laid all Europe at their feet, for to all intents and purposes Europe had nothing with which to oppose them. Relations had so far improved that Kublai Khan sent ambassadors to the Second Council of Lyons in 1274, and by the end of the century the Mongol menace could be definitely discounted.

The first traveller we are concerned with existed long before the menace was heard of; his name was Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela, in Navarre. He was a Jew, and was occupied in his eastern travels between 1160 and 1173. Within this period, he visited Syria, Jerusalem, Damascus and Bagdad. He went to Egypt, Assyria, Persia, and touched the frontiers of China. What he says agrees in the main with the works of contemporary Arabians. One may note, above all, his firm, though unbigoted, adherence to Judaism. His account shows the universal distribution of the Jews throughout all those countries he visited. He nearly always, for instance, gives the Jewish population of each town which he visits, and names the most prominent among his co-religionists.

According to the Rabbi, Ceylon was noted for its practices of human sacrifice, and for its inhabitants, the Druses, who were fire-worshippers. He says that the people sometimes devoted themselves

to death, and permitted themselves to be consumed by fire; by so doing they gained the admiration of their neighbours.

To one who has read the text as a whole, it seems that the Rabbi was free of intent to deceive, and seems to have been a level-headed and trustworthy witness. His book as a contemporary account is invaluable, giving as it does a picture of events and social conditions in the East during the 12th century.

Next in order of time among the travel books is the journal of Friar John of Pian De Carpin. He was born in 1182, nine years after Rabbi Benjamin concluded his land voyage. He entered at an early age the Order of Friars Minor, or Franciscans, and held offices in Saxony, Germany, Spain, and Cologne. After 1241, when the Mongols threatened European civilisation, he was sent by Innocent IV to protest against their unjustified attack, and to find the extent of their power. He started from Lyons, on Easter Day 1245, and returned about two years later. His account gives us an insight into the manners, religion, and politics of the invaders of Europe; and the boundless extent of their pride and ambition. Friar John begins his journal with praise and condemnation of the Mongol character. They are, he says, more obedient to their superiors than any other people on earth. They seldom or never fight among themselves, and manslaughter is unknown among them. They are hardy, and though able to fast for two days, are given to drunkenness. Chastity is highly valued among them, and those taken in adultery are put to death. But in spite of the virtues they practice towards each other, they are to other nations, most insolent, disdainful, false and treacherous. "The slaughter of other people is accounted a matter of nothing with them."

In the matter of religion, they hold the most trivial superstitions, and take the violation of these for most heinous offences. "But to slay men, to invade the dominions of other people, and to rifle their goods, to transgress the commandments and prohibitions of God, are with them no offences at all." All new enterprises among them are begun at the new or full moon, which they call the Great Emperor, and worship on bended knees. Having delineated the nature of the Mongols, the Friar proceeds to their first expansion and conquests. The organisation of the army which he ascribes to Chinghis Khan reminds us of the Roman model. There were captains of ten, of a hundred and of a thousand, and over each ten of the last he placed one colonel. Two or three chiefs command the whole army. To prevent retreat, their backs are left unprotected with armour. Unless they all consent to retreat, everyone who deserts is executed. Because of their long exercise in war, they are a nation of soldiers, and employ captives to fight in their vanguard. If the prisoners refuse, they are put to the sword.

He then goes on to advise the best methods of offence and defence against the Tartars. They greatly dread handbombs and crossbows, and so the knights who fight against them must be provided with these weapons. It would furthermore be advisable to dip the arrowheads in salt water, so that they may be hard enough to pierce the armour of the enemy. Other tactics which must be guarded against are the Tartar custom of surrounding an army in an open place, and so destroying it. Sometimes they pretend to retreat, and lure the pursuers into an ambush.

After these preliminary remarks, he tells us of his reception at the court of Prince Batu. The Prince detained certain of their company, on the pretence of wanting to send them back to the Pope. This the Friar and his companions afterwards found was not actually done. After days of weary travel, they at last reached the court of Kuyuk Khan. They were in time for his election—when they arrived there was a Regency under the Empress Turakina. More than 4,000 ambassadors had arrived before them, including the two sons of the King of Georgia, the Ambassador of the Calif of Bagdad, who was a sultan; and more than ten other sultans besides. After the enthronement of the Emperor, which took place in great splendour, he sent to Friar John, and received from him the Pope's messages. Having received in turn the despatches of the Emperor, Friar John learned that the Mongols wished to send legates to the Pope. This request he very wisely refused, and his reasons will surely commend themselves to everyone. "First, because we feared lest they, seeing the dissensions and wars which are among us, should be the more encouraged to make war against us. Secondly, we feared that they would be spies and informers in our dominions." Having discharged their business, the Friar and his fellows set out on their way home.

Friar John died in 1252, and the next year another priest, also a Franciscan, was sent on a similar embassy by the King of France. His name was Friar William of Rubruck. He went in the first place to Sartach, son of Batu, Louis IX having heard that Sartach had become a Christian, and desired to have diplomatic relations. We cannot here give all the information which Friar William compresses into his journal, but shall confine ourselves chiefly to his communications with Sartach and the Great Khan, Mangu. The mission found Sartach in the midst of a great court. They were presented by Coiac, a Nestorian and a Court official and they stood before Sartach, who "sat majestically, having music and dancing in his presence." He asked who was the greatest Prince among the Franks, and was told it was the Holy Roman Emperor. He dissented from this, and said that in his opinion it was the King of France. The next day they showed their books, and ecclesiastical vestments; and had an anxious moment when they were asked whether they would bestow them upon Sartach as a present. He was at length prevailed upon to accept lesser gifts, and allowed them to retain their more precious possessions. Before departure, they were asked that they should not report Sartach was a Christian. "Because the name of Christian seems to them to be the name of some nation. So great is their pride, that although they believe perhaps some things concerning Christ, yet will they not be called Christians, being desirous that their own name, that is to say Moal (Mongol) should be above all other names." From Sartach they went to Batu, his father.

Kneeling before Batu, they instructed him in the error of his ways, and asserted that "you shall not obtain the joys of heaven, unless you become a Christian." When they had concluded, the assembled Mongols clapped their hands and laughed. Little progress was made towards Batu's conversion, and he inquired why Louis had left France with an army, and with whom he waged war. Friar William informed him that it was against the Saracens. The interview was inconclusive, and Batu later said that they could not stay in the country without the permission of Mangu Khan. He ordered them accordingly to go to the Court of Mangu. It was on January 3, 1254, that they finally obtained an audience with the Great Khan. He offered them in hospitality a rice drink, limpid and sweet like wine, which Friar William drank "by mere politeness." The Khan was not pleased that they had visited Sartach before him. Nothing important was decided at this preliminary meeting, and the Khan's secretaries sorely annoyed the Friar by "inquiring if there were in France many sheep and cattle and horses, as if they were about to invade us and take possession of all."

Of the many occasions when Friar William appeared before the Khan, the most interesting is that on which he was asked to expound his religion, along with Saracens, Nestorians, and Tuins (idolators). As a preliminary to the discussion, the Khan issued the following order: "This is the order of Mangu and no one dare say that the commandment of God differs from it. He orders that no one use disagreeable or injurious words towards his adversary, nor cause a wrangle that may disturb the conference, under penalty of death." The Tuin

opened the argument by asking the Friar whether he wished to discuss first the origin of the world or the destiny of the soul after death. To this he replied that it was fitting to discuss first God, who was the Source of all things. His adversary sought to prove that as there were many leaders above men, so there must needs be many Gods in heaven. Moreover, he asserted that no Omnipotent God existed. To this Friar William retorted: "Then none of your Gods can ever save you, for it can happen that he have no power. Besides, no one can serve two masters; how, then, can you serve so many Gods in heaven and on earth?" So was the question of the Deity debated with interest in former days.

After some more exchanges, the discussion ended, and had an aftermath some days later; again in the presence of the Khan. After some inconclusive religious debate, the Khan intimated his desire that Friar William should leave his dominions. As the Friar refused to bring back with him Mongol ambassadors, Mangu gave him letters for King Louis. This concluded with a kind of warning to the French, lest they might be tempted to declare war. Mangu in effect says that his people are invincible. After this final interview, the return journey was begun. On his way back the Friar met Sartach once more, and went to visit Batu, as he had done previously. He stayed a month with Batu before a guide could be procured, and then, thinking that Louis was still in the Holy Land, travelled south. The King had in fact left for France, and the monk says that had he known this, "I would have gone through Hungary and arrived sooner in France, taking roads less difficult than through Syria." It was in the monastery of his Order at Acre that he wrote the account of his travels, and sent it to Louis. It is of interest that Roger Bacon met him several years later, and made detailed notes of his adventures. Friar William's book, it may finally be said, has few rivals in the realm of travel literature.

The last of these Mediaeval travellers was Friar Odoric, who, like the two previous wayfarers, was also a Franciscan. He soon became famous for his holiness and austerity of life; living as he did on bread and water, going barefoot, and wearing turn and turn about a haircloth and a shirt of iron mail. Long before his travels commenced he was credited with the power of miracles. About 1318 he was sent into Asia as a missionary, and had with him an Irishman, Friar James, for a considerable portion of his journey. Malabar is an initial point for him "and many other heinous and abominable villanies do these brutish beastly people commit," says he, after mentioning their "idolatry." Within a certain church in the kingdom of Mobar, which is ten days' journey distant, is the body of St. Thomas the Apostle. Leaving this region he passed to the islands of Sumatra and Java. He also visited the Island of Ceylon, in which the inhabitants pointed out a huge mountain, where Adam is reputed to have mourned for 500 years for his son Abel: Leaving this place he continued to Fu-chow and Hang-chow, the last of which was under the rule of the Khan.

Friar Odoric was present for three years at the Court of the Khan, and often partook of the Imperial banquets. At this time the Khan lived in a state of aloof majesty, and was paid the most punctilious respect. None of his lords could speak as much as one word without his sanction, "neither dare they attempt to do aught, but only according to the pleasure of their emperor." His dominions were of incredible extent. "Whereupon his empire is of that length and breadth that to whatsoever part thereof he intends his journey, he has space enough for six months' continual progress, except his islands which are at the least five thousand." He celebrated four great feasts during the year: his birth, circumcision, coronation, and marriage. To these he invited his barons, stage-players, and kindred. After three years' residence at the Court, Friar James set his face towards the west, and arrived at Lhasa. He draws a comparison between the Abassi, or head of the Tibetan religion, and the Pope. The full description of Friar Odoric's travels were taken down about 1330. He died in January, 1331, and his fame as a saint and traveller spread far and wide.

All these ancient texts, giving a picture of the East in all its material splendour and squalor seven centuries ago, would well repay study.

LONDON NOTEBOOK

Burmese Journalists

One member of the Burmese press delegation which ended during the month a four-week visit to the UK paid at the invitation of the Foreign Office, was U Htin Fatt, mentioned in U Nu's recently published book as one of the foreign service cadets-in-training who worked with him during the Japanese occupation of Burma. He has since abandoned the idea of a diplomatic career and is editor of a Rangoon newspaper. The party also included the first Burmese newspaper editor from outside Rangoon to come to London since the end of the Second World War, U Sein Win of Mandalay. With two colleagues, U Soe Maung and U Maung Maung, the visitors managed to see a great deal in their short time in the country and took a very lively interest in land tenure and landlord-tenant relationships.

Indian Cartoonist

A. M. Abraham's Exhibition of Drawings at the Writers' and Artists' Club bore witness to the versatile young Indian artist's draughtsmanship, sense of humour and charm. Abraham, who was born in Malabar,



"First turn to the right, then to the left, and then follow the smell of curry."
(An Abraham cartoon)

made a name for himself as a leading cartoonist on *Shankar's Weekly* in Delhi before coming to London less than a year ago. Since then his work has appeared in a number of London publications. At his show, critical colleagues admired most of Abraham's lighter work, such as a satirical series entitled "An Indian Abroad," and pages from a "London Sketchbook," in which elegant and polite fun is poked at some English institutions. The first item to sell was a portrait drawing of Rabindranath Tagore.

Chinese Sailors

Quite the most unusual, and probably the most cheerful party of Asian visitors London has seen for a long time, arrived in the capital for a one-day visit. They were thirty-one Chinese members of the crew of the

LONDON'S HONG KONG RESTAURANT
58-60, Shaftesbury Avenue
London, W.1

1 minute from Piccadilly (Ger 6847)
Open daily noon to 11 p.m., including
Sundays. Fully licensed.

destroyer depot ship HMS Tyne which returned to Plymouth in May after nearly two years with the navy in the Far East. As a result of a meeting of the ship's welfare committee it was decided to offer the day's outing in London as a token of appreciation for the service given by all sixty-five Chinese members of the ship's company.

London Vihara

Notable features of the past month have been the two most important religious occasions of the London Asian community. This year's celebration of the Festival of Wesak by Buddhists was marked by the formal opening of the London Vihara by the Venerable Narada Thera. The speakers included U Maung Maung Ji of the Burmese Embassy, Mr. Christmas Humphreys, President of the Buddhist Society, and Miss Lounsbury representing *Les Amies de Bouddhisme* of Paris. The Buddhist Vihara



The new Indonesian Ambassador to the Court of St. James's, Dr. Raden Supomo, entering the carriage on the way to present his credentials at Buckingham Palace on June 1.

Society was also represented and Mr. P. Meddagodda of Ceylon House appeared as secretary of the London Buddhist Vihara Society, which is responsible for the establishment and will be responsible for the upkeep of the new vihara. The Venerable Narada Thera declared that the vihara would also act as educational and cultural centre where buddhists of East and West could meet on a common platform.

New Mosque

Id ul Fitr, or as it is better known to most Asian followers of Islam, Hari Raya, was the date chosen for the laying of the foundation stone of the new Central London Mosque which is to be erected in the grounds of the Islamic Cultural Centre, Regents Park. There was a very large gathering for the occasion, which took place after the prayers which formally bring to an end the month of Ramadan. The High Commissioner for Pakistan and the full board of trustees for the mosque comprising the London representatives of twelve Islamic states laid the stone jointly, and the High Commissioner announced that it is hoped to begin the task of building within a matter of months.

ASIAN DIPLOMATS IN LONDON

Najib-Ullah

DR. NAJIB-ULLAH, Afghanistan's new Ambassador in London, took up his post only last May. As a newcomer to the Court of St. James, he is still busy making the ritual contacts with other diplomatic missions here, and getting his bearings in the current of British affairs. Nevertheless, he found time to talk of his country and his ideas.

Though still only 40, Dr. Najib-Ullah has already to his credit twenty years of service to the Afghan nation. He graduated in international law and political science at Isteklal College, Kabul, and completed his studies in France, where he obtained the degree of Doctor of Literature at the University of Lyons. In 1934, at 20, he joined the Afghan Foreign Office, where he held successively the posts of Secretary, Press Department; Assistant Director, Treaties Section; Chief of the League of Nations Department; and General Director for Political Affairs.

Between 1937 and 1951, as a member of various official missions, he visited in turn the Soviet Union, Iran, India, Cairo, Pakistan, the Lebanon, Indonesia, and finally the USA. During the last war, he left government service to become Professor of Political History at Kabul University, and member of the Council of the Bank of Afghanistan. But he was soon back in office, becoming Minister of Education from 1946 to 1949, and then Ambassador to New Delhi from 1949 to 1953.

This post he filled with great success, winning understanding for his country and popularity for himself. He was numbered among the personal friends of Mr. Nehru and other political leaders, while also becoming intimate with many Indians in the ordinary walks of life. He combines with great learning a modest, unpretentious manner and sincerity of expression.

A scholar and creative artist who knows five languages (his native Pushtu, Persian, French, Arabic and English), Dr. Najib-Ullah has published poetry and lyric prose in Persian, and in English is the author of a number of monographs on the history and foreign policy of his country.

In modern times, the Afghans fought to a standstill three British invasions from India, two of them in the 19th

century and the third after the first world war. For two centuries they successfully kept at bay both Tzarist and British imperialism. Britain, however, before leaving India and Pakistan, dealt Afghanistan one final blow by handing over to Pakistan a disputed area outside the former British North-West Frontier, which is inhabited by seven million Afghans (Pakhtuns, as they are called in their own language).

Though this remains a sore point, Dr. Najib-Ullah comes here as a friend of Britain and the Commonwealth.

He believes that in due course justice for Pakhtunistan must prevail, not least since any frictions in this strategically important part of the world holds great potential dangers. World peace and the sovereign independence of small nations are the first essential, and both these objectives are, in his opinion, wholly in line with Britain's present interests, just as they have often been the driving force in Britain's diplomacy in the past.

Furthermore, as the Ambassador points out, the basic principles of Afghan foreign policy are exactly the same as India's, and were conceived even before India became independent. These principles can be summed up as world peace, colonial independence and non-involvement

with the great powers or power-blocs. In both world wars, Afghanistan remained strictly neutral. In the cold war, she has refused to be deflected from her independent, friendly relations with all countries. In the United Nations, she is frankly partisan in all issues of colonial freedom.

Afghanistan is a Moslem country, but the small minorities of Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jews enjoy complete equality in law and society.

"They are all Afghans," says Dr. Najib-Ullah.

In spite of the handicaps of poverty and economic backwardness, Afghanistan is making steady progress according to plan in agriculture, small industries, education and social welfare. Education, for instance, is entirely free, from the primary school straight through the universities, and, on occasion, the state even finances foreign training in Europe or America. Industrial and other

(Continued on page 50)



BRITAIN'S NEW ATTITUDE TO ASIAN AFFAIRS

By Andrew Roth

SINCE turning down M. Bidault's invitation to intervene at Dien Bien Phu, Britain has backed into the position of the West's leading mediator. Unlike Sir Winston Churchill, who sought actively the role of world peacemaker in May, 1953, Mr. Anthony Eden has backed into the role by withdrawing from the "great gamble" at Dien Bien Phu and by being himself—the cautious but thorough diplomat—at a time when there are historic opportunities for calm and experienced diplomacy in close touch with the aspirations of South Asia.

One of the most striking indications of the change in the British Government's attitude and position in world affairs was contained in Mr. Aneurin Bevan's voice on May 17. He actually spoke softly to Sir Winston Churchill! This may sound unimportant to those who do not realise that the fiery Welshman has been a Churchill-baiter for a quarter of a century—ever since his maiden speech in the House of Commons in 1929.

The softening of Mr. Bevan's attack on the Conservative Government on May 17 may have been, to some extent, a tactical effort to seem "reasonable" in the current right wing Labour effort to isolate the Bevanites. But basically it stems from a change in Government policy so marked since April 25 that Mr. Bevan might almost welcome Sir Winston Churchill and Mr. Anthony Eden to the ranks of the quasi-neutralists.

The increasing semi-independence of Britain's position can be confirmed also by the growing volume of criticism by American newspapers. Not all of these attacks are from those who believe that an ally should tamely follow in every gyration the proposals by conflicting American foreign policy spokesmen.

It is ludicrous, of course, to suggest that Sir Winston is any less determined to maintain the Anglo-American alliance. He has simply found the courage to disagree on how to handle the Geneva talks and on the time-table needed to establish SEATO. He is, as announced, willing to sponsor staff talks to assess the South-East Asian military talks, *provided* they do not involve a commitment *at this time*.

There were cheers in the House of Commons on May 17 when Sir Winston said that he wanted to say nothing to make "more difficult" the task of Mr. Eden, who, he emphasised, "is doing all in his power to help in finding an agreed basis" for Indo-China "to bring the fighting to an end on terms acceptable to both sides." Mr. Eden's efforts as a mediator in Geneva have rebuilt his political stature. He is felt to be realising Britain's basic desire: to use its reasoning power and diplomatic experience to establish Britain's position as the West's mediating power in the "cold war."

Mr. Eden clearly enjoys his new-found semi-independence. When he rose at Geneva to call for country-wide elections in Korea, he was parting company

with the American delegation which was shackled to Syngman Rhee's demand that there be elections only in the North, for the inclusion of a minority of North Koreans in the present South Korean Government.

His determination to try to find the basis for a cease-fire in Indo-China which will limit the Viet Minh, if possible, to its present position in North Viet Nam, is strengthened by the apparent absence of an American policy. His attitude towards Mr. Dulles was not improved when he learned from the newspapers for the first time that the US and France were discussing behind his back the policy to follow in Indo-China. For a diplomat like Mr. Eden, this failure to keep him informed in the midst of ticklish negotiations was an unpardonable error.

These specific events and personal reactions simply highlight the British move back to fundamentals. The fundamentals themselves are not new. But the recent Dien Bien Phu crisis and its shattering impact on an American policy based on internal political myths and external bluff has sharpened Britain's determination to return to fundamentals in international relations, which can be coolly appraised against a background not of what Senator McCarthy said the day before yesterday but the lessons of three hundred years of international power politics.

The first of these realities, the British insist, is that China is a Communist power and likely to remain so, with the outside chance that it might become Titoist if properly handled. "The Communist victory throughout the length and breadth of China brought about the greatest swing in the balance of world forces since 1917," *The Times* underlined on May 17 in an editorial significantly entitled "Basis for a Policy." "Throughout history, whenever there has been a heavy swing in the balance of forces—such as the present Chinese swing to alliance with Russia—other powers have found it wise to recognise the fact and have sought a new equilibrium."

The second fundamental reality is that South Asia is an area of tremendous importance to Britain and to the whole non-Communist world. Britain needs no lessons on the economic or strategic importance of South Asia from Washington, since for two hundred years Britain has been the leading western power in the area and still derives a very considerable portion of its political and economic influence from its ties with its dominions, colonies and other sterling area countries in the region.

The third basic factor is that the process by which the South Asian states have won or are winning their political independence has left a residue of anti-imperialism which the Communists can exploit more easily than the West can overcome.

The fourth fundamental is that the West has economic strength but very little in the way of military manpower. France is hard put to find soldiers for Indo-China. Britain's entire army—except for one brigade—is committed overseas.

And, despite all the "liberation" talk of Mr. Dulles, the US army is being cut down to satisfy Republican election slogans about budget cutting and tax savings. Moreover, none of the western democracies is likely to increase its availability of manpower because—short of a blatant and obvious act of aggression—neither American, nor British, nor French public opinion will agree to provide it.

"There is only one sure way of bringing British and American thought and policy into line," argued *The Times*. "That is by spending less time in conjecturing what China may or may not be by nature, and more time on coolly appraising what the prime western interests in South-East Asia are, which of these interests cannot be given up, and how best they can be upheld. The argument is thereby shifted from the unassessable to the assessable."

It then provided its own assessment: "Britain would always fight in defence of Malaya and she has hardly a less direct concern in seeing that neighbouring countries are in friendly control."

The Times then gently suggested America "put up or shut up," although not in quite those words. "If the other leading and active powers—the United States, France, New Zealand and Australia—put forward no less clearly their own irreducible strategic interests in the region, there could follow an assessment of available resources, and the kernel of a defensive policy could begin to form. It would be a policy based on abiding interests rather than one suddenly summoned up by a crisis, and the world would know on what line foreign aggression would be resisted."

In short, Britain might conceivably join in a declaration protecting the borders of Laos and Cambodia from a Viet Minh incursion. But it will not be panicked into ineffective action in North Viet Nam to rescue the French from American-supported strategical errors.

In the British pursuit of basic realities, India and its relationship with Pakistan plays a vital role. Neither Sir Winston nor Mr. Eden shares Pandit Nehru's ideological conceptions. But it is difficult for anyone except Senator Knowland—certainly for any inheritor of imperial British traditions—to ignore the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent because of the promises of Siam and the Philippines.

American strategists have not been slow to understand this in purely man-power terms. The recent alliance with Pakistan is a clear attempt to raise there the troops called for in President Eisenhower's injunction "let it be Asians against Asians." The British reluctantly endorsed this pact. But they clearly would have preferred to move very slowly, getting India to go along too, if possible, instead of arousing Indian resentment and suspicion. After all, what is the mandate of the Mohammed Ali Government? The East Pakistan elections tended to indicate that the US-Pakistan alliance is safeguarded only by the absence of elections in West Pakistan and the widespread Pakistani feeling that anything that India objects to must be good for Pakistan.

The cautious British see little point in rushing ahead into isolation and thus playing into Communist hands. Why take a stand very quickly if it means that you must

do it without adequate troops or friends? The British have the old-fashioned idea that a South Asian pact is meant to be effective in South Asia, not in US Senatorial wrangles.

Mr. Eden's extensive efforts to keep South Asian premiers informed on developments in Geneva and to involve them in the Indo-Chinese peace settlement is based on several calculations. It will take considerable man-power to observe a cease-fire line in Indo-China, and preferably man-power from a state or states which both sides will respect and seek to impress. Clearly, therefore, it would be best if they came from India, which has already made such a creditable showing in Korea, or from India in concert with Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia.

By involving these states Britain hopes to win the long-range battle for South Asia. There is some hope here that the fundamental anti-imperialism which bedevils any western effort to organise South Asia against the Communists may be overtaken by anti-Communism in the process of actual contact with Communist unreasonableness. The risk, however, is that the Communists are now working hard at their "reasonable" line.

The British do not imagine that short, say, of an armed Chinese Communist invasion of Burma, that Burma, Pakistan or India is likely to commit men and arms (as distinct from Pakistan Government promises) to the anti-Communist cause. Britain realises, for example, in Viet Nam the bulk of outside troops would have to be supplied by the West. Moreover, any form of military alliance, such as SEATO, must also have a political basis.

To achieve both, the British have been pushing the "two-tier" approach. The political support for, say, a cease-fire in Indo-China, would come from the South Asian states. The military threat to keep the Communists from crossing the agreed line would be provided by the West.

The difficulty in this superficially-attractive approach lies in applying it to specific realities. Thus Pandit Nehru has agreed to act in Indo-China if asked to by "both sides." Which is the non-Communist side: Bao Dai, the French or the Americans? France might be willing to accept more of a compromise than Bao Dai who is completely dependent on French bayonets and American arms and dollars. As Bao Dai's spokesman at Geneva indicated, the hard-playing ex-Emperor is willing to accept little less than surrender from the victorious Viet Minh!

What will Washington encourage Bao Dai to do? The rate at which President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles have been back-peddalling suggests they might—in private—accept less than unconditional surrender from the Viet Minh. But what can they accept in public without being damned as "appeasers" by the club-wielders in their own party?

It is partially this paralysis of American policy, partly the unusual reasonableness of the Communists, but above all Britain's determination to follow a "middle course" and avoid war that is pushing Mr. Eden more and more into Pandit Nehru's lap and earning softer words from Mr. Bevan for Sir Winston.

ECONOMIC SECTION

CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE EXPANDS

By Lu Hsu-chang

(Managing director of the China
Import and Export Corporation, Peking)

IN the four and a half years that have passed since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, more than 50 nations all over the world have begun to trade with us. Twenty-five of them have signed formal trade agreements or contracts with China. The total volume of our foreign trade in 1953 was six times greater than in 1949, the year of liberation: China's foreign trade in 1953 was the biggest of any year since 1930.

As our national economic construction continues to develop, bringing further improvements in the people's living standards, China's foreign trade is bound to grow too. One important factor favouring such growth is the increased output of export commodities. Since the land reform, the situation in agriculture has taken a sharp turn for the better. Formation of tens of thousands of agricultural producers' cooperatives by the peasants has led to bigger crops, further widening the domestic market. Trade between town and country is brisk. All this, naturally, has greatly facilitated the export of agricultural products and minerals. Exports of both black tea and frozen meat, for example, are now three times what they averaged before the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War in 1937. China is also exporting many products of light and handicraft industry—including cotton textiles—as well as small machines and chemical products.

CAPACITY TO IMPORT

China's capacity to absorb imports is rising too. The country is in the second year of its first Five-Year Plan of industrialisation. Heavy industry is being built up. Light industry, agriculture and transport are undergoing corresponding development. Naturally, in these circumstances, many types of machinery, equipment and industrial raw materials must be bought abroad. Moreover, the peasants, with the new enthusiasm for production that comes from working for themselves instead of the landlords, require producers' and consumers' goods in ever larger amounts. They are buying chemical fertiliser, for instance, at a rate 2.7 times that of 1937. As income and popular demand rise in both cities and villages, we will certainly

The author is also a member of the China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade.

require imported goods to meet various needs in the cultural, educational, medical and hygienic spheres as well as for goods used in daily life.

All these facts demonstrate the bankruptcy of the US policy of trying to hinder the progress of China's economy in general, and her foreign trade in particular, by embargo and attempted blockade. This policy has harmed the American people, and the peoples of other capitalist countries, much more than it has harmed China. Seeing this, capitalist countries, apart from the few which continue to adhere to the US embargo policy in disregard of the interests of their own populations, have sent delegations of business men to Peking to negotiate trade agreements and sign business contracts.

Many examples can be cited of how the US policies have harmed the trade of third countries. It is well known, for instance, that trade between China and Japan was very large before the war. In recent years, however, because of US threats and pressure on Japan, it has not been possible to restore this normal international exchange between neighbours. What is the result? According to official statistics issued in Tokyo, Japan spent an extra US\$59m. in 1952 alone because she could not import salt, coal, iron filings and soybeans from China and had to buy them from other countries, especially the United States, instead.

Some countries, however, have made efforts to emerge from such a situation, with benefit to themselves. Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia said to journalists in

FOR BULK CHEMICAL SUPPLIES—

CONSULT



Telephone: Grosvenor 5301 (10 lines) Telegrams: Propanco, Piccy, London
Cables: Propanco, London. International Telex No. London 8207

STERLING HOUSE, 8, HEDDON STREET, REGENT STREET, LONDON, W.1

Djakarta last February that Indonesia had suffered too long from the Washington-devised embargo. Months earlier, on May 18, 1953, the Indonesian newspaper *Merdeka* stated editorially that Indonesia had lost US \$300m. through restrictions imposed by Washington on her trade with the Soviet Union, China and other people's democracies, while US "aid" given to her in the same period did not exceed US\$16m. In November last year, a trade agreement was signed between China and Indonesia. The Indonesian people welcomed it and gave it their warm support, considering that this indicated that their country was starting along the road of independence and freedom in the sphere of foreign trade.

A long-term trade agreement exists between Ceylon and China. Washington has attempted to secure the cancellation of this agreement by threats, but the people of Ceylon have strongly opposed such interference. The chairman of the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Robert Senanayake, said recently: "We deplore any move to cancel the China agreement. I cannot see any advantage in exchanging the financial benefits we have gained for the lend-lease policy of the United States." The continuing efforts to destroy the agreement with China are causing deep concern to the people of Ceylon. They feel that to stop trade with China would be equivalent to economic self-strangulation. They are well aware that American "generosity" towards Ceylon can last only as long as Ceylon stays in step with US foreign policy, which has nothing to do with the interests of their country.



Chinese trade representatives—the first official mission from Communist China to Britain—arriving at London Airport on June 28. The party, consisting of officials of the China Import and Export Corporation, came to Britain as a result of talks carried out in Geneva between the Chinese and Mr. Peter Tennant, overseas director of the Federation of British Industries.

CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE

A 64-page analysis and guide for the British business man.

Background
Organisation of Foreign Trade
Volume of Trade
Direction of Foreign Trade
Composition of Chinese Trade—
Imports ; Exports
British Exports to China
China's Exports to Britain

AND

Eleven appendices listing Trade Agreements, China's requirements from Britain, Chinese Trade Corporations, British Organisations interested in Trade with China, Statistics of Trade, Points for guidance on methods of contact, forms of contract, payment, shipping, insurance, inspection, etc.

Published by the

BRITISH COUNCIL FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

15, HANOVER SQUARE, LONDON, W.1

Telephone : MAYfair 0073-4-5

PRICE 5/- (post free)

TRADE WITH WEST

Among countries of northern Europe, Finland has made the most notable increase in her trade with China. The trade agreement between Finland, the Soviet Union and China benefits all three countries. The Helsinki newspaper *Vapaa Sana* has pointed out that the export of paper pulp to China will be of great help in lessening unemployment among Finnish workers.

Statistical returns issued by various countries in western Europe also show a growth of trade with China. British exports to China in 1953 were one-third higher than in 1952. France's trade with China increased twofold in the same period, and West Germany's almost tenfold. Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy and the Netherlands did between two and three times as much business with China in 1953 as in 1952.

All the same, the trade between western Europe and China cannot be said to have developed to the degree that it might and should have done. This is because some of the countries concerned still follow the US embargo policies in varying degrees. But their business people, and particularly their exporters, understand clearly that a slump in the US economy is coming, and that they must therefore

ASIA REPORT

A duplicated bulletin for businessmen, contains the latest information on trade and industry in Asia and on commercial relations between the Asian countries and other parts of the world.

Published monthly by Eastern World

Annual Subscription: £3 - 10 - 0

(for subscribers to Eastern World: £3 - 0 - 0)

Write for specimen copy to:

ASIA REPORT, Eastern World,

45, Dorset Street, London, W.1

redouble their efforts to reopen the channels of East-West trade. They know perfectly well that Washington will not and cannot help them: that they must find outlets for themselves. With each day, the urgency of developing trade with China is felt more keenly. This is evident from the increasing number of west European business men who are seeking contact with Chinese trade representatives stationed in Berlin.

Even trade between China and the United States has not been stopped entirely in the past few years. Though the US government has done its utmost to prevent such trade, a survey by the American Exporter Publications, the results of which were published on December 10, 1953, shows that US business men want it. This survey covered 576 export managers of firms doing an aggregate international export business of US\$1,500m. It revealed that 361 of these managers, 73 per cent., expressed their wish for the resumption of fuller trade with Hong Kong.* Everyone familiar with world trade knows that business in Hong Kong depends chiefly on business with the mainland of China.

China's trade with the Soviet Union and the people's democracies is growing constantly. At the same time, however, China has made sustained efforts to resume and develop trade with capitalist countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. The advantages of such equal and mutually profitable trade are especially evident to nations which have suffered from price-cutting, foreign monopoly purchasing, and unreasonable interference and control of their commerce.

China, with her huge potentialities for economic progress and foreign trade, is willing to develop good business relationships with the governments and peoples of all countries, to come into closer contact with them and to promote mutual understanding and friendship.

*New York Times, December 11, 1953.

THE DISTILLERS COMPANY LTD.

Torpichen St., Edinburgh, Scotland

Cables: "Distillers, Edinburgh"

**Manufacturers of Yeast for Baking
and Medicinal Purposes**



700 million

potential customers for the manufactured goods of the western world live between Cyprus and Japan. The vast material resources of the East are in turn vital to the productive industries of Europe and the West.

To foster legitimate commerce between these two great and mutually dependent markets—whether in trade, in shipping, or insurance—has been the abiding endeavour of Steel Brothers for more than eighty years.

Branches, Subsidiaries & Associates at:

ADEN				
BRITISH GUIANA	-	-	-	Georgetown
BURMA	-	-	-	Rangoon, Bassein, Moulmein
CANADA	-	-	-	Calgary, Vancouver
CEYLON	-	-	-	Colombo
CYPRUS	-	-	-	Nicosia
HONG KONG				
INDIA	-	-	-	Bombay, Calcutta, Dibrugarh, Gauhati, Jorhat, New Delhi, Siliguri, Tezpur
IRAQ	-	-	-	Baghdad, Basra, Kirkuk, Mosul
ITALY	-	-	-	Milan
JAPAN	-	-	-	Tokyo
JORDAN	-	-	-	Amman
KENYA	-	-	-	Mombasa, Nairobi
KUWAIT				
LEBANON	-	-	-	Beirut, Tripoli
PAKISTAN				
EAST	-	-	-	Chittagong, Narayanganj
WEST	-	-	-	Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi
SIAM	-	-	-	Bangkok
SYRIA	-	-	-	Damascus, Lattaquieh
TANGANYIKA	-	-	-	Dar-es-Salaam, Lindi
UGANDA	-	-	-	Mikindani, Tanga
				Kampala, Masaka, Masindi

STEEL BROTHERS & Company Limited

ESTABLISHED 1870

HEAD OFFICE:

24 to 28 LOMBARD STREET, LONDON, E.C.3

TELEPHONE: MANSION HOUSE 0982

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS: STEEL STOCK LONDON

JAPAN'S TRADE WITH ASIA

By our Tokyo Correspondent

JAPANESE efforts to gain a substantial access to the markets of Asia have not met, so far, with the success which was perhaps expected. The following figures show the recent developments.

	Japan's Export to (millions of Yen)		Import from (millions of Yen)	
	1952	1953	1952	1953
Asia Total ...	236.237	235.630	227.758	287.562
Korea ...	17.944	38.459	7.351	3.084
Formosa ...	21.840	21.948	22.955	23.054
China ...	216	1.634	5.885	10.692
Hong Kong ...	29.052	22.400	2.474	2.852
Burma ...	7.631	11.905	10.736	18.090
Malay and Singapore	22.685	14.215	21.949	22.832
Indonesia ...	21.543	37.957	9.895	17.585
India ...	13.211	9.871	26.449	27.059
Pakistan ...	42.406	5.367	29.663	38.891
Philippines ...	7.066	9.916	18.374	22.584
Thailand ...	13.096	18.918	22.486	30.474
Others ...	39.547	43.040	49.641	70.373

These figures reflect clearly the deterioration of Japan's trade relations with other Asian countries, in spite of the fact that here and there more satisfactory trends can be noted.

There are two schools of thought now prevalent in Japan on the subject of her trade with Asia. One advocates the fostering of Japanese trade with mainland China as the panacea for Japan's economic ills: every transaction with China is hailed by this group as one step further on the road to Japan's economic rehabilitation. As a matter of fact, although the trade with China is to-day still far below its pre-war level, there are signs of a steady growth. The volume of trade in 1953 represented 0.3 per cent. of the total export of Japan, as against 0.4 per cent. in 1952, and 1.2 per cent. as against 0.75 per cent. of the total imports of Japan in 1953 and 1952 respectively. The second school of thought—under American influence—points to South-East Asia as the most promising market for Japan. There she could play an important part in the development of these large, under-developed areas which lack both capital goods as well as consumer goods. However, the still unsolved problem of Japanese reparations to the countries of South-East Asia and their apprehension that economic influence will eventually lead to the revival of Japanese exploitation and colonialism, are weighty obstacles in the way of the restoration of normal relations. The recent abrupt cessation of reparation talks at Manila illustrate the situation. After a preliminary agreement was reached between the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Minister in Manila, the Government of Japan named early in April a five-man delegation headed by Shozo Murata to enter into formal reparation talks with the Philippine Government. It is understood that Japan had offered a ceiling amount of 400m. dollars in reparations,

with the calculation that the industrial projects to be undertaken under the reparations programme will eventually prove to be worth one billion dollars—the amount which the Philippine Government apparently had undertaken to obtain and to which it seemed to have committed itself towards parliament. Anyway, much emotionalism arose around this issue at both ends, Tokyo and Manila, and it was decided to create a “cooling off” period—instead of declaring an open rupture. For once, another attempt to settle the reparations issue with a potential customer in South-East Asia, had failed. The settlements with other countries, particularly with Burma and with Indonesia, have not progressed.

5-15 September

**LEIPZIG
FAIR
1954**

with Technical Fair

Full particulars and Visitors' Official Fair Documents from:

The Leipzig Fair Agency, Willoughby & Young,
6a, Smith Street, London, S.W.3

Manchester Chamber of Commerce, Trade Enquiries
Department, Ship Canal House, King St., Manchester 2.

The Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce and Manufactures,
25, Charlotte Square, Edinburgh 2.

LEIPZIGER MESSEAMT POSTFACH 329

PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

By a Karachi Correspondent


A STUDY of the progress of development in Pakistan during the last 6½ years will reveal that there has been a gradual process of transition from a predominantly agricultural to an industrial economy. The process is still continuing, but its pace, thanks to the efforts of the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, has been greatly accelerated. Not only this. The progress has, moreover, been so regularised by the PIDC as to leave no vital and paying industry undeveloped. A third and in no way less important contribution of the PIDC to the industrial development of Pakistan has been the creation of confidence among business men to invest in the industrial undertakings of the country. Capital, which was shy a few years ago, is now readily available for large-scale developments.

The Government of Pakistan followed a policy of non-interference in the industrialisation of the country during the first 3-4 years after its inception. But the results were not altogether satisfactory. Firstly, Pakistanis were mostly new to this field and had little experience of setting up industries; secondly, they were mostly attracted to a few enterprises to the neglect of other important ones and, thirdly, the right atmosphere for an all-round industrialisation of the country was lacking. The Government realised

that any further drift in its policy would prove harmful to the larger interests of the country. A number of vital industries such as chemicals, fertilisers, cement, sugar, iron and steel, shipbuilding, paper, wool and jute were not receiving the attention they deserved, either due to lack of experience, want of capital or the absence of the necessary incentive.

In order to correct these deficiencies in the economic life of the country, the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation was set up on January 12, 1952, by an Act of Parliament passed two years earlier, i.e., in 1950. But by the establishment of the PIDC the Government of Pakistan in no way aimed at the nationalisation of industries. Its main purpose was to bring about co-ordination between public and private capital which would provide the necessary incentive for stimulating industrial activity. The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation supplements and does not supplant capital and enterprise. In fact, it hands over every project that it builds to the public by floating individual public companies as was done in the case of the Karnaphuli Paper Mills. The other projects of the PIDC, as well, will come into public possession in the course of time.

Ailsa



Manufacturers of
DOXFORD

OPPOSED
PISTON
ENGINES
UP TO 3300 BHP

Builders of
Modern Passenger
and Cargo Vessels
up to 350 ft.

AILSA

SHIPBUILDING CO. LTD.

Telegraphic Address: 'SHIPYARD' Troon

TROON, Ayrshire

Telephones: TROON 38, 39 & 58

The Board of the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation consists of three Directors (including the Chairman), of whom two are private industrialists whose votes can over-rule the decision of the Chairman, who is a representative of the Government. As such, the entire working of the PIDC is on a purely commercial basis. Red-tape has been completely eliminated and the Board of Directors is vested with full financial powers. Further, the different heads of Departments of the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation have been delegated all the powers necessary for the quick implementation of its schemes.

The primary concern of the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation is to see that industrialisation is uniform and that no important industries are neglected even if they have no private capital. This purpose is achieved by financing the projects entirely from public money. As such, most of the PIDC projects are carried out with the finances advanced by the Government.

The Corporation, in a way, stands charged with the responsibility of implementing the Two-year plan and the Six-year National Plan in respect of the industries which are included in the Corporation's charter and which cannot be set up by unaided private capital alone. Even in cases where the Corporation fails to elicit private capital in the initial stages, it endeavours to transfer them to private enterprise at later stages. Fortunately, the activities of the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation have exercised such a salutary influence on the general trend of industrialisation in the country that response to the shares of the companies floated by it has been highly encouraging. Only recently the Corporation put Karnaphuli Paper Mills shares worth Rs. 30m. on the market and in two hours about thrice the amount was subscribed by the public.

The Board of Directors of the Corporation, consisting at present of Mr. Ghulam Faruque (Chairman), Mr. M. A. Ispahani (Member), and Mr. Naseer A. Shaikh (Member) is assisted by experts (Pakistanis as well as foreigners) in all spheres of industrial development. The Head Offices of the Corporation are located in Karachi, a regional office at Chittagong and a branch office in Lahore.

The industries entrusted to the Corporation are 1. Jute ; 2. Paper ; 3. Heavy engineering, including Iron and Steel ; 4. Shipbuilding ; 5. Heavy Chemicals ; 6. Fertilisers ; 7. Cement ; 8. Sugar ; 9. Textiles ; 10. Sui Gas ; and 11. Pharmaceuticals.



Habib Bank Limited

Established 1941

Head Office : KARACHI (PAKISTAN)

Authorised Capital	-	-	Pak Rs. 30,000,000
Issued and Subscribed	-	-	Pak Rs. 15,000,000
Paid-up Capital	-	-	Pak Rs. 15,000,000
Reserve Funds	-	-	Pak Rs. 10,000,000
Deposits as on Dec. 31, 1953			Pak Rs. 372,700,000

In selecting desirable trade relations for exports and imports with Pakistan, Habib Bank Limited, with 56 branches spread over West and East Pakistan can prove to be most helpful, and you are invited to use our services.

The Bank is fully competent to handle all foreign exchange business, including opening and advising of commercial letters of credit, collection of documentary bills, remittances, etc.

FOREIGN BRANCH

Bombay (INDIA)

Habib Bank (Overseas) Limited,

Head Office : KARACHI (PAKISTAN)

Branches : 1—Rangoon (Burma) and 2—Colombo (Ceylon)

Correspondents and Agents at all important cities of the world.

The PIDC has at present 22 projects in hand and will make a total investment of Rs. 55 to 60 crores (£55-£60m.) till 1956. Of this, private capital will be Rs. 20 crores. So far the Corporation has invested Rs. 15 crores (£15m.) of public, and Rs. 10 crores (£10m.) of private money on different projects. Another £15m. will have been advanced by the Government in the next two years, making a total of £30m. till 1956. During this period £8m. will be received from foreign countries as aid under the US Foreign Operation Administration and the Colombo Plan. The total investments will thus be :—

Government investments	£30m.
Private Capital	£20m.
Foreign Aid	£8m.
Total	£58m.

**THE
BANK
LINE**

Far East & USA: Far East & Africa

AMERICAN AND ORIENTAL LINE U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Coast ports to Philippines, Japan, Hong Kong, Indonesia and Malaya, returning to Canada and U.S.A. via Suez Canal.

ORIENTAL AFRICAN LINE Carrying passengers and cargo from Japan, Hong Kong, Philippines, Borneo, Saigon, Bangkok and Malaya to Mauritius, Reunion, East and South African Ports and vice versa.

ANDREW WEIR SHIPPING & TRADING CO. LTD.,
BALTIC EXCHANGE BUILDING, 21, BURY STREET, E.C.3

By 1956 the scheme will cause savings in foreign exchange and additional earnings of approximately £44m. per annum and provide employment to about 75,000 persons in its factories and projects.

The PIDC has made considerable progress on many of these schemes. Three jute mills, one paper mill and two

woollen mills have already gone into production and 11 more are scheduled to start production this year, i.e., 1954. These are : Four jute mills and one 50,000-spindle cotton mill in East Pakistan, a DDT plant, a caustic soda plant, and a paper board mill at Nowshera (NWFP), a straw board mill, a sulphuric acid plant and a sugar factory in the Punjab.

AUSTRIA'S TRADE WITH PAKISTAN

By H. Hirschrodt (Karachi)

AUSTRIA'S trade with Pakistan depends mainly on her ability to cope with the new economic position in Pakistan. During the "Korea Boom" it was easy to export to Pakistan any kind of goods, especially consumer goods. The prices of jute and cotton—the main export articles of Pakistan—were high. Besides, Pakistan had not devalued her currency and an abundance of foreign exchange was, therefore, available for the import of all kinds of commodities.

At that time, the trade between Austria and Pakistan commenced, and the main Austrian export articles were matches, embroidery and artificial jewellery. Further, a voluminous Six Year Programme for the development of

the country and its industry had been introduced, for which foreign exchange was easily available.

As Austria is especially interested in exporting finished goods, Pakistan seemed to be the ideal partner for her, the more so as Pakistan was the exporter of raw materials needed by Austrian industry.

With the end of the Korea Boom the prices of cotton and jute dropped about 50 per cent., the foreign exchange dwindled and Pakistan had to decide to use her foreign exchange for the development and the industrialisation of the country rather than for the import of consumer goods. Therefore, the kind of commodities constituting the trade between Austria and Pakistan had also to be changed.

As Austria is also very interested and in a position to

Dr. Hirschrodt is the Austrian Trade Representative in Pakistan.

Lobnitz

THE NAME TO REMEMBER IN DREDGING

help Pakistan in developing her industry, besides the old and traditional items of paper and cardboard quite a number of new items had to be introduced and have already been exported to Pakistan. Austria could deliver heavy machinery and implements, such as generators and turbines, transformers, cables and any kind of electrical equipment, household meters; pumps; agricultural machinery and scythes, tractors; road and building construction machinery; magnesite fire bricks; diesel engines and electric motors; railway cars and wagons, locomotives and railway equipment, rails, signalling equipment; pig iron and steel (especially high-grade steel); iron and steel constructions, grates for dams; aluminium (bars and semi-finished products); optical instruments (microscopes, microtomes), geodetical instruments, binoculars and cameras.


According to the orders placed by Pakistan with Austrian firms it can be assumed that the Austrian export figure for the year 1954 will be some 50m. to 60m. Austrian schillings, with increasing export prospects for 1955 and 1956.

On the other side, Pakistan can offer Austria quite a variety of interesting articles, like jute, cotton, hides and skins, casings, tea and even sports articles and similar commodities if the trade between the two countries can be approximately balanced.


DECHMONT

AGRICULTURAL TRAILERS

FOR DURABILITY AND GOOD SERVICE



Write for details to



GROUP MARKETING (OVERSEAS) LTD

75 Victoria Street, Westminster, London, S.W.1

Cables: Groupmar London.

Telephone: Abbey 1508

EMBROIDERIES AND LACES

of all kinds



VERBAND DER VORARLBERGER
STICKEREIINDUSTRIE

Dornbirn - - - - Austria

Austrian Textile Industry and South-East Asia

SINCE the end of the war the Austrian textile industry has resumed and developed its traditional trade with South-East Asia by importing raw materials from that area, and by exporting semi- and fully-manufactured textiles to South-East Asian countries.

In 1953, Austria imported raw cotton from Pakistan to the value of 32·5m., from Burma to the value of 0·9m. and from India to the value of 6·1m. Austrian schillings. In addition, imports of cotton waste from India amounted to the value of 1·4m. schillings. During the same year Austria imported jute from Pakistan to the value of 42·1m., sisal from Indonesia valued at 0·7m., coir yarn from India valued at 4·9m. Austrian schillings.

The total value of Austria's imports from Pakistan in 1953 amounted to 77m., out of which the imports of textile raw materials accounted for 74·6m. Austrian schillings. During the first quarter of 1954 the value of imports of Pakistan cotton decreased to 3·8m. schillings, but the imports of jute increased to 17·4m. schillings.

Austrian exports of textiles included in 1953 (*in Austrian schillings*): Cotton yarn to India—0·2m., to Thailand—0·1m.; cotton woven fabrics to British Malaya—2·7m., to Burma—1·5m.; lace and lace net to Burma—0·4m., to Thailand—0·4m., and to British Malaya—0·2m.;

IMPORTANT Source of Information for Businessmen

"EAST-WEST COMMERCE"

A monthly newsletter providing factual information on the actual trade as well as on the trading possibilities between countries of Eastern Europe with countries of the West.

Yearly Subscription: £5 5s. 0d.

Trial Period of 6 months: £2 12s. 6d.

Published by

FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS LTD.

45, Dorset Street, London, W.1.


embroideries to Thailand—13·8m., to British Malaya—3·2m., to Burma—0·7m., to Indonesia—0·4m., and to Pakistan—0·3m.

Austria also exported staple fibre to India to the value of 1·1m. schillings and staple fibre printed fabrics to Burma valued at 0·9m. Austrian schillings.

During the first quarter of 1954 Austria exported cotton lace and lace net to Malaya, Singapore, Burma, Ceylon and other Asian countries. Burma was the main market (the exports to Burma reached the value of 313,000 Austrian schillings). Cotton embroideries were exported to India, Malaya, Singapore, Burma, Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, Philippines and other countries of that region.

DREDGERS

SUCTION
BUCKET
GRAB. ALLUVIAL



Twin Screw Stern Well Barge loading
BUCKET HOPPER DREDGER "CARRICK"
constructed for the L. M. & S. Railway Co.

BARGES SALVAGE and SLUDGE VESSELS TUGS and KINDRED CRAFT

with
STEAM, DIESEL or
ELECTRIC POWER

for
SEAGOING, RIVER, HARBOUR
AND ESTUARY SERVICE

Simons
OF RENFREW

WM. SIMONS & CO., LTD.

RENFREW

SCOTLAND

In the transformer field...

the lead is taken by

**HACKBRIDGE
TRANSFORMERS**

**HACKBRIDGE AND HEWITTIC ELECTRIC CO., LIMITED
WALTON-ON-THAMES - SURREY - ENGLAND**

Telephone : Walton-on-Thames 760 (8 lines)

Telegrams : "Electric, Walton-on-Thames"

OVERSEAS REPRESENTATIVES—AUSTRALIA : Hackbridge & Hewittic Electric Co., Ltd., Sydney. INDIA : Steam and Mining Equipment (India) Ltd., Calcutta ; Easun Engineering Co. Ltd., Madras, I. IRAQ : J. P. Bahoshy Bros., Baghdad. MALAYA, SINGAPORE & BORNEO : Harper, Gilfillan & Co. Ltd., Kuala Lumpur. NEW ZEALAND : Richardson, McCabe & Co. Ltd., Wellington, etc. PAKISTAN : James Finlay & Co. Ltd., Karachi. SOUTH AFRICA : Fraser & Chalmers (S.A.) (Pty.) Ltd., Johannesburg. SOUTHERN RHODESIA : Fraser & Chalmers (S.A.) (Pty.) Ltd., Salisbury, etc.

RAILWAYS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

By A. James

TO overcome the inadequacy of transport facilities in South-East Asia is an important and integral part of the development plans of the South-East Asian countries. This inadequacy hampers economic development, while the execution of such development plans makes additional demands on the transport systems. In fact, all plans of development depend to a large extent on the capacity of countries to provide the required transportation of capital goods, food products, raw materials and manufactured goods. Thus, the development of the transport facilities gains an additional urgency. Governments of South-East Asian countries are fully aware of these problems, and the high priority given to the development of transport is clearly reflected in the Colombo Plan.

Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indian Minister for Transport and Railways, wrote recently, that "as alternative modes of transport, such as, waterways and the roads, have not developed in India to the extent they have in other countries, Indian Railways will continue to function as by far the most important means of inland transportation in this country for many years to come." (1)

During the last few years some progress has been made in rehabilitation of war damage and further development of railways. Important organisational improvements were achieved, including the zonal grouping of railways in India (amalgamation of smaller independent lines) in 1951-52. On a regional basis valuable work was done by the Railway Sub-Committee of ECAFE, and a number of conferences on various problems of railway transport were held. In October 1953 ECAFE arranged an inspection tour of West Europe for a group of railway officials from the region to enable them to see the modern practices, techniques and equipments adopted by the railways in these countries, so that they could improve their methods of working. In May, representatives from South-East Asia attended the International Railway Congress in London. The opening of UN Railway Training Centre in Lahore is an important step towards providing the region with trained signalling and operating officials.

Additional mileage of railway track has been built, but in this field the scope for further work is still very great. Independent observers consider that the building of a second south-north trunk-line in Burma with several links to the existing line would be of great importance. In Pakistan, the construction of the broad-gauge line linking Sind, Punjab and Baluchistan via Dera Ghazi Khan (which was decided upon in 1952 but was put off owing to financial stringency) was begun recently and will represent a valuable addition to the country's railway network.


Throughout the region advances in the standardisation of rolling stock have been achieved, and progress in the electrification of some railways has been made. Mr. F. C. Badhwar, Chairman of the

(1) Foreword to *Indian Railways, one hundred years, 1853-1953* (Ministry of Railways, Government of India, New Delhi).

NAJIB-ULLAH—Continued from page 37

constructive work is proceeding under a government plan, and though British, American, French, Russian or other experts are engaged in executing certain projects, the capital and ownership remain entirely in Afghan hands.

Social conditions, too, are changing fast, and many of the feudal and Moslem customs are giving way to modern ideas. To a direct question, the Ambassador smilingly admits that he has "only one wife." Polygamy is dying out, and is encountered only in remote districts or among the older, orthodox Muslims. Dr. Najib-Ullah



**self
drive**

A 1954 SELF-DRIVE CAR model of your choice, will meet you on your arrival in Britain. No formalities, lowest possible charges. Or, if you purchase a new car, we will re-purchase it at the end of your leave at a guaranteed price. May we send you our latest illustrated brochure? You will find it interesting and informative. Write to AUTOHALL, Dept. 21-A, 302-306 King Street, London, W.6.
Telegrams: AUTOHALL, WESTPHONE, LONDON
Cables: AUTOHALL, LONDON.

Indian Railway Board, declared, during his recent visit to London, that India plans to electrify many miles of her railways.

Large orders have been placed by the Governments of South-East Asian countries to replace the over-age rolling stock and to provide additional facilities to cope with increasing demands of goods and passenger traffic. During the war no replacement was possible, and the railways were called upon during the war years to carry out additional tasks. It is noteworthy that in March, 1949, nearly 30 per cent. of the total number of the locomotives of the Indian State Railways were over-age.

Pakistan which has at present 1,318 locomotives, including 66 diesel-locomotives, imported alone during the first 2 months of this year 77 locomotives and 37 boilers (during the same period 2 boilers have been manufactured by the Pakistan Railway Workshop). The deliveries of 199 broad gauge oil tank wagons ordered with Hurst Nelson and Co. Ltd. are to begin this month. Ceylon has placed an order for 25 diesel mainline locomotives with Brush Bagnall Traction Ltd. Five of these locomotives have already been delivered. Burma last year placed large orders for railway wagons with Du Croo & Brauns, and with Waggonfabrik Talbot.

India has imported railway locomotives, tenders and parts to the value of over 60 million Rs. during the past 3 years. Imports of railway wagons and parts have been valued at over 70 million Rs. during the last 2 years. India intends to achieve a high degree of self-sufficiency in providing railway rolling stock (locomotives are being built at Chittaranjan and by the Tata Locomotive & Engineering Company in Jamshedpur) and also plans to manufacture electric traction equipment. But India's need of locomotives is still very great, and she has recently placed further large orders. These new locomotives are to be put into service before the end of 1955. In addition to locomotives, orders have recently been placed for locomotive parts and boilers with several manufacturers, including North British Locomotive Co. Ltd. to the value of over £200,000, with Simmering, Graz Pauker A.G. to the value of over £65,000, with Henschel & Sohn—over £33,000. In addition, India has to receive locomotives from Canada under the Colombo Plan.

himself married very early, at the age of 18. He has two sons aged 21 and 19, both of whom are studying and still unmarried.

Though his country is a small one, Dr. Najib-Ullah points out that it has a special position today, situated as it is between the USSR, China, India, Persia and the latest American protégé, Pakistan. But Dr. Najib-Ullah is confident that in the world of today, public opinion has itself become a material force that challenges even great wealth and armed might.

HURST, NELSON RAILWAY ROLLING STOCK

Hurst, Nelson Wagons are efficient and economical; their high standard of manufacture makes them so. They give a long life of dependable service with the minimum of maintenance. Whatever the design and purpose of the wagon you require, Hurst, Nelson will produce it exactly to your instructions or will submit design and specification to meet your requirements.



Your enquiries are invited.

HURST, NELSON & CO., LTD.

DESIGNERS & BUILDERS OF RAILWAY ROLLING STOCK
MOTHERWELL, SCOTLAND


Phone: MOTHERWELL 500

Grams: NELSON, MOTHERWELL



LONDON OFFICE: 30 ASHLEY PLACE, S.W. 1

Phone: TATE GALLERY 0404





"THE EXPORT MARKET"

for 33 years Germany's leading export journal will contact you free-of-charge with reliable German manufacturers and will help you in obtaining agencies.

★ ★ ★



Write today for complimentary numbers of the following special editions.

"Machinery and Electrical Equipment."

"Vehicles, Agricultural Machines and Accessories."

"Consumer Goods."

Vogel-Verlag . Coburg . West Germany
GERMANY'S LEADING TRADE
PUBLISHERS



ONE OF THREE
2½ YARD DIESEL-ELECTRIC DIPPER DREDGERS
BUILT FOR
THE ROYAL IRRIGATION DEPARTMENT, SIAM.

OUTPUT: 148 cubic yards of silt and clay per hour dumped to a radius of 72 feet and a clear height of 20 feet.

DREDGING ? REQUIREMENTS ?

CUTTER & DRAG SUCTION DREDGERS
SINGLE & MULTIPLE BUCKET DREDGERS
OF HIGHEST DREDGING CAPACITY.

HOPPER BARGES: PIPE LINES:
FLOATING CRANES, ETC.

FLEMING & FERGUSON LIMITED

SHIPBUILDERS & ENGINEERS
PAISLEY : SCOTLAND

Phone. Paisley 4121, Tel. Add. "Phoenix Paisley"

Company Meeting**THE ORION INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED****FURTHER EXTENSION OF ACTIVITIES****INCREASE OF ISSUED CAPITAL****SIR STRATI RALLI'S STATEMENT**

The 24th annual general meeting of The Orion Insurance Company, Ltd., was held on July 6th at 70/72, King William Street, London, E.C.4.

The following is the statement by the chairman, Sir Strati Ralli, Bt., M.C., which had been circulated with the report and accounts for the year ended December 31st, 1953.

The Year under review has been one of considerable activity in all Departments.

Bearing in mind that it has been a period of general recession in values and that the total volume of business on offer accordingly tended to contract, the further substantial development in our Direct Fire and Accident underwriting is, we feel, very encouraging.

Having regard to the substantial growth in the Company's business, your Board recently decided to establish the office of a General Management of the Company. With effect from April 19th, 1954, Mr. T. R. Easton and Mr. J. Greenshields, M.C., T.D., have been appointed Joint General Managers.

Mr. Easton has been with the Company since its inception and has held the office of Manager since 1944; Mr. Greenshields has had a long and valuable experience in the Insurance Industry and we welcome him to his new office.

Our appointments as Marine and Aviation Underwriters for The Drake Insurance Co. Ltd., and for the Sphere Insurance Co. Ltd., have been extended as from January 1st, 1954, to cover all classes of Fire, Accident and Miscellaneous Insurance business.

MARINE DEPARTMENT

In the Marine Department the Net Premium Income for 1953 amounted to £1,008,355 compared with £1,265,009 for 1952.

The Marine Market is passing through a highly competitive phase. The reduction in Premium Income is due not only to the reduced values and to the lower rates now prevailing, but also to the fact that in many cases rates have fallen to levels which, in our view, are uneconomic and such business we have been obliged to decline. The position in the Cargo Market has continued to be particularly difficult.

It is this reduced Income which largely accounts for the increase in the ratio of total Claims Paid in respect of all Years to 94 per cent. of Premiums as compared with 78 per cent. shown on the substantially higher Premium Income in 1952. Expenses of Management amounted to 7 per cent., compared with 6.4 per cent. last year.

The 1951 Account has proved a lean one, but we have nevertheless felt justified in transferring the sum of £20,000 to Profit and Loss Account.

The Marine Fund now stands at £1,342,704 (133 per cent.) compared with £1,375,474 (108 per cent.) at the end of 1952.

I am glad to report that the 1952 Account shows some improvement over the 1951 figures and that the 1953 Account, so far, is following the same trend.

FIRE, ACCIDENT AND MISCELLANEOUS DEPARTMENT

The Net Premium Income in this Account amounted to £891,858 compared with £866,057 for 1952.

The net increase in Premium Income of £25,801 is the result of an increase in the Direct Fire and Accident business written by the Company in the London Market and through Overseas Agencies,

offset by a reduction in the Excess of Loss Reinsurance Section of our business. It has been the aim of your Board to bring about a more even balance between these two Sections of our business and substantial progress has now been made in this direction.

Claims Incurred were 71 per cent. on Premium Income compared with 77 per cent. for 1952. Commission and Expenses together were 23 per cent. compared with 18 per cent. The Account has had a slightly more favourable experience than last year and, after maintaining the Unexpired Risks Reserve on the usual basis of 50 per cent., has yielded a Profit of £44,450.

PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT

After bringing in Gross Interest and Dividends of £153,048 (£116,410) and Transfers from Revenue Accounts of £64,450 (£68,268), and after deducting Directors' Fees £2,871 (£1,933), Other Expenses and Audit Fee £31,629 (£29,101), Overseas Taxation £7,188 (£3,853) and providing the sum of £110,000 (£110,000) for United Kingdom Taxation, the Net Balance for the year amounts to £65,810 (£39,791). To this has been added the sum of £103,482 brought forward from 1952 making a total of £169,292 available for distribution.

Your Directors recommend the payment of a Dividend of 10 per cent., less Income Tax, for the Year 1953 (same) which requires a net sum of £24,750 and, after transferring £2,000 to Provision for Staff Contingencies, there remains a balance of £142,542 to be carried forward to the next Account.

BALANCE SHEET

The total of Invested Funds, as shown in the Balance Sheet, is £3,271,908 and the Market Value or, where there is no quotation, the estimated value of our Investments at December 31st, 1953, was in excess of the Balance Sheet figure.

GENERAL REMARKS

Your Directors are of the opinion that the Issued Capital of the Company should again be increased and it is proposed, therefore, as soon as the necessary formalities can be completed, to invite Shareholders whose names shall appear on the Register of Members at the close of business on July 7th, 1954, to subscribe for a further 50,000 Ordinary Shares of £1 each, at par, in the ratio of one new Ordinary Share for every nine Ordinary Shares held. Provisional Letters of Allotment will be sent out in due course. The new Shares will not rank for any part of the Dividend recommended for the Year 1953, but, otherwise, will rank *pari passu* with the existing Ordinary Shares.

The effect of this operation will be to increase the Issued and Paid-up Capital to £500,000, which is the full amount of the present Authorised Capital of the Company.

I know you will wish me to place on record our appreciation of the very good services rendered to the Company throughout the past year by the Management, Senior Officials and all Members of our Staff.

To all our Agents and friends, both at home and overseas, many of whom we have had the pleasure of seeing in London or of visiting in their own countries during the past year, we tender our sincere thanks for the valued support they have given us and for their continued efforts on behalf of the Company.

Established 1797

DERBY & CO. LTD.**11-12 St. Swithin's Lane, London, E.C.4**

Tel: MIN 5272 (P.E.)

Grams: PLATIVET, LONDON

Members London Metal Exchange*Specialists in*

WOLFRAM	•	SCHEELITE
CHROME	•	MANGANESE
MOLYBDENITE	•	BERYL
TANTALITE	•	ILMENITE
COLUMBITE	•	RUTILE
LEAD	•	ZINC • TIN
COPPER ETC.		

Smelting Works and Refinery: BRIMSDOWN, MIDDLESEX

OFFICES AT:

NEW YORK • JOHANNESBURG • ADELAIDE**SWEDISH PORTLAND CEMENT****A Quality Superior
to Specifications****BRITISH:**
B.S. 12 : 1947 and 1370 : 1947**U.S.**
A.S.T.M. C150-49 Type I and II**Loading direct to ocean-
going vessels at our own
factory ports *without*
*transhipment*****Strong 6-ply paper bags
guarantee first-class packing
for every shipment****Manufactured in Sweden by the factories of****C E M E N T A****The Swedish Cement Sales Corporation****Mail and Cable : Cementa Malmö**



Handiest tractor in the world

Farmers in 76 countries of the world will tell you how the famous Ferguson System has speeded the work, eased the labour and slashed the costs of land cultivation. Many will also testify to the amazing versatility of Ferguson tractors and implements on other jobs, too — for this revolutionary System was designed to mechanise much more than just straightforward farm-work.

The fast, one-man operation that makes Ferguson such a time and money saver can be applied to far more tasks than you might

imagine. Goods can be quickly hauled to market or railhead by one man, a tractor and trailer. With the Loader, the same man can load or unload material of great bulk or weight. Then with other Ferguson implements, he can deal with the next assignment — grading roads, clearing snow, shifting earth, pumping for irrigation, powering belt-work, sawing wood and a multitude of other jobs previously only possible with many different machines.

Next time you have a tough job . . . bring in Ferguson tractors and Ferguson implements !



Ferguson



Ferguson tractors are manufactured for Massey-Harris-Ferguson (Export) Ltd., Coventry, England, by The Standard Motor Company Ltd.



Waste Not, Want Not

WHEN AN I.C.I. RESEARCH WORKER produces a new chemical compound, it may turn out quite unsuitable for its intended purpose. But that does not always mean that the compound is useless. To make sure that nothing is wasted, nearly all new compounds prepared in I.C.I. laboratories are sent either to I.C.I.'s medical and veterinary research station, to its agricultural and plant protection stations, or to other I.C.I. research establishments, where they can be tested for any worthwhile property that might be developed for the benefit of industry or agriculture. The powerful 'Gammexane'

insecticides, incorporating the gamma isomer of benzene hexachloride, were developed by workers at I.C.I.'s plant protection station on the basis of initial research in the laboratories of I.C.I.'s General Chemicals Division.

This cross-fertilisation of one division by another ensures that every new compound will be critically examined and, if valuable, manufactured. Such a system, only possible in a large-scale organisation, is one reason why I.C.I. has been able to make so many of the most significant chemical discoveries of modern times.

Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., London, England



